COMMENT

ICWA AND THE UNWED FATHER:
A CONSTITUTIONAL CORRECTIVE

TAYLOR DOW†
The Indian Child Welfare Act provides important procedural protections
for American Indian children, the parents of American Indian children,
tribes, and Indian custodians in state court child custody proceedings.
However, the Act excludes unwed fathers who have not “acknowledged or
established” their paternity from its definition of “parent.” This effectively
forecloses their ability to assert rights to their biological children under the
Act. State courts have varied in their interpretations of “acknowledged or
established,” with some incorporating their own laws and others adopting
amorphous standards of reasonableness to determine whether an unwed
father is a “parent” under the Act. The varying approaches adopted by state
courts have highlighted the need for a more standardized interpretation of
“acknowledged or established.” This Comment looks to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl for guidance. Though
Adoptive Couple did not directly address the definition of “parent,” it
appeared to invoke the Court’s “biology plus” jurisprudence while
interpreting the Act. That case law etched the parameters of putative fathers’
paternal rights. This Comment incorporates the principles elucidated in
those cases into “acknowledged or established” and posits that where
enough time has passed for an unwed putative father to develop a
constitutionally protectable relationship with his American Indian child, but
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where that father has not met state law paternity requirements consistent
with the Act, a state court should next consider whether the putative father,
consistent with the Court’s biology plus jurisprudence, has developed a
parent–child relationship sufficient for due process protections to attach.
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INTRODUCTION
Fatherhood, as a legal concept and social role, has eluded concrete legal
definition.1 In the context of the Indian Child Welfare Act of #YP_ (ICWA),2
that nebulous term has also bedeviled the unwed putative fathers to whom it
applies,3 shrouding their attempts to assert rights under ICWA in
indeterminacy.

1 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective
on Parents’ Rights, #] C ARDOZO L. R EV. #P]P, #P_]-_$ (#YY%) (“Father[hood] is filled with
contradiction: . . . central to children’s experience yet increasingly transient; culturally
defined by procreation but made real only through nurture; conceptually separate from
mothering yet embedded in a network of interdependence; most valuable when offered as
a gift, and yet often least valued when freely given.”).
2 W$ U.S.C. §§ #YX#–#YO% (WX#W).
3 In WX#O, the most recent year for which data is available, %Y._% of all children born in the
United States were born to unmarried women. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OP
NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. #, tbl.I-P (WX#_).
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Enacted to shield American Indian families and tribes4 from the
unwarranted removal of their children, ICWA provides procedural
protections for American Indian children, their parents, tribes, and Indian
custodians in state court child custody proceedings. But § #YX%(Y) of the
Act excludes “unwed father[s] where paternity has not been acknowledged
or established” from its definition of “parent.”5 ICWA, however, does not
define “acknowledged or established.”6 This has led state courts to adopt
their own, often conflicting, definitions.7 As a result, varying standards8
for determining the paternity rights of unwed men with American Indian
biological children have effectively undermined the uniformity which
ICWA sought to impart in the child welfare proceedings of Indian
children.9 The resulting confusion has highlighted the need for a uniform
standard.10
4 For purposes of consistency, all references to tribes in this Comment conform to the
requirement of federal recognition embedded in ICWA’s definition of tribes. See W$ U.S.C.
§ #YX%(_) (WX#W) (“‘Indian tribe’ means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or
community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary
[of the Interior] because of their status as Indians, including any Alaska Native village . . . .”).
There are $P% federally recognized Indian tribes in the United States. Indian Entities Recognized
by and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, _] Fed. Reg.
#WXX (Jan. %X, WX#Y).
5 W$ U.S.C. § #YX%(Y) (WX#W).
6 In re S.A.M., PX% S.W.Wd OX%, OXP (Mo. Ct. App. #Y_O); see also Michael J. Dale, State
Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Unstated Best Interest of the
Child Test, WP GONZ. L. REV. %$%, %OX-O# (#YY#) (“How one establishes or acknowledges
paternity is a difficult question to answer in its own right, even outside the context of the Act,
and has produced substantial litigation and commentary.”); Kevin Heiner, Note, Are You My
Father? Adopting a Federal Standard for Acknowledging or Establishing Paternity in State
Court ICWA Proceedings, ##P COLUM. L. REV. W#$#, W#$% (WX#P) (noting that the Bureau of Indian
Affairs’ WX#O ICWA guidelines did “nothing to resolve the ambiguity” surrounding these terms).
7 Compare Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, YXO S.W.Wd #$W, #P% (Tex. App. #YY$)
(adopting a state law standard for determining paternity for unwed fathers under § #YX%(Y)),
with Michael J., Jr. v. Sr., P P.%d YOX, YO% (Ariz. Ct. App. WXXX) (rejecting an application of
state law paternity establishment requirements under ICWA).
8 See Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_, W$O (#Y_%) (“Rules governing . . . child custody are
generally specified in statutory enactments that vary from State to State.”); June Carbone, The
Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family Identity, O$ LA. L. REV. #WY$,
#WY$ (WXX$) (“Not only are jurisdictions irreconcilably divided in their approach to parentage,
decisions under settled law in a given county may not necessarily come out the same way.”).
9 See B UREAU OF I NDIAN A FFAIRS , I NDIAN C HILD W ELFARE A CT G UIDELINES O
(WX#O) (observing that the “disparate application of ICWA based on where the Indian child
resides creates significant gaps in ICWA protections and is contrary to the uniform
minimum Federal standards intended by Congress”).
10 See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interests of the Tribe: The Indian Child
Welfare Act and the Adoption of Indian Children, OO U. DET. L. REV. ]$#, ]$_-$Y (#Y_Y) (noting
that “courts are having difficulty figuring out whether children of obvious Indian lineage are
within the ICWA definition of ‘Indian children’ when their mothers are non-Indian and their
fathers are Indians and tribal members, but do not meet the ICWA criteria for ‘parent’”).
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This Comment proposes a constitutional solution to defining these
terms. It rejects an application of § #YX%(Y) controlled entirely by state law.
Rather, it posits that where an unmarried father fails to satisfy state law
paternity establishment procedures consistent with the plain terms of the
Act, a court should next look to the constitutional principles and standard
established by the Supreme Court in a series of cases considering the
parental rights of unwed fathers. That “biology plus” line of precedent
grants unwed fathers parental rights when they have developed a
substantial relationship with their children. Applying that precedent in
conjunction with state law permits the Constitution to serve as a backstop
where an unwed father of an Indian child may have failed to satisfy state
law governing paternity but nonetheless created a constitutionally
cognizable (and protectable) relationship with his child.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of the treatment of
American Indian children by the federal and state governments which led
to ICWA’s enactment.11 It also provides an overview of ICWA provisions
pertinent to the determination of paternity under the Act. Next, Part II
surveys state courts’ conflicting rulings construing § #YX%(Y) and considers
the impact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby
Girl should play in interpreting the provision moving forward. Part III
describes the Court’s seminal biology plus cases and the shift they
generated in paternal rights. Part IV then considers issues arising from state
law incorporation after reviewing states’ methods for establishing paternity.
Part V first sketches arguments in favor of employing biology plus
principles, and then proceeds to describe those principles in greater detail.
Finally, this Comment concludes by invoking those principles as a clarion
call for their incorporation into § #YX%(Y) where unwed fathers do not
satisfy state paternity requirements.
I. THE BIRTH OF A MILESTONE: ICWA AND THE INDIAN FAMILY
This Part traces the plight of American Indian children prior to the
enactment of ICWA. It then analyzes ICWA’s provisions, considering in
turn the protections they provide to Indian children, their parents, and
Indian tribes and custodians in the quest to shield them from the
indignities which led to the Act’s creation.

11 See Lorie Graham, Reparations and the Indian Child Welfare Act, W$ LEGAL STUD. F.
O#Y, OW] (WXX#) (“By the time ICWA was enacted into law in #YP_, one-third of all Native
American children were being removed from their communities and families and placed in nonIndian foster care, adoptive homes, and educational institutions.”).
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A. A History of Suffering
Throughout modern history, Native peoples have often occupied a
precarious position both within the American polity and the land which
now constitutes the American union.12 Much of that precariousness often
stemmed from concerted movements, spearheaded by the federal
government, towards tribal destruction and forced assimilation of tribal
members.13 At the inception of the American union, Indian tribes were
viewed as separate, sovereign nations within the territorial limits of the
United States.14 Their presence, in large part, shaped the framing of the
Constitution,15 punctuated the powers of the federal government over
Indian affairs,16 and limited the role of states in subjecting recalcitrant
tribes to their laws.17 Tribes were treated like foreign nations, with
treatymaking often dictating their relationships with the United States.18
Those relationships, however, quickly eroded. Whereas Indian tribes
initially commanded a fearful respect in the fledgling republic,19 that respect
12 See United States v. Kagama, ##_ U.S. %P$, %_# (#__O) (“[T]he relation of the Indian
tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since he Revolution, to
the people of the United States has always been an anomalous one and of a complex
character.”); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, %X U.S. ($ Pet.) #, #O (#_%#) (“[T]he relation of the
Indians to the United States [was] marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no
where else.”); FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW O]# (#Y_W ed.) (“Prior to
#_P#, most Indians were considered to be members of separate political communities and not
part of the ordinary body politic of the United States.”). Indian tribal members were not granted
universal citizenship until #YW$. Citizenship Act of #YW], ch. W%%, ]% Stat. W$% (overturning Elk
v. Wilkins, ##W U.S. Y] (#__]) (rejecting a claim of American citizenship by an Indian who was
born on tribal lands but later renounced his tribal affiliation)). Prior to the universal grant of
citizenship, the citizenship status of individual Indians “generally depended upon the effect of
particular federal statutes or treaties upon her tribe . . . because the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . was held inapplicable to Indians who had been born under tribal authority.”
Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, _# MINN. L. REV. %#, ]W n.]_ (#YYO).
13 Supreme Court case law chronicled those movements with the panache of an obtuse
bystander. See, e.g., Board of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Seber, %#_ U.S. PX$, P#$ (#Y]%) (“In the exercise
of the war and treaty powers, the United States overcame the Indians and took possession of
their lands, sometimes by force, leaving them an uneducated, helpless and dependent people
. . . .”).
14 Williams v. Lee, %$_ U.S. W#P, W#_ (#Y$Y).
15 See generally Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, O% DUKE L.J. YYY (WX#]).
16 See, e.g., U.S. C ONST . art. I, § _ (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes”).
17 See Worcester v. Georgia, %# U.S. (O Pet.) $#$, $O# (#_%W) (invalidating a state law
attempting to place restrictions on access to tribal lands).
18 Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, $ AM.
INDIAN L. REV. #%Y, #]# (#YPP).
19 Worcester, %# U.S. at $]Y (“The early journals of congress exhibit the most anxious desire
to conciliate the Indian nations.”); COLLIN CALLOWAY, THE INDIAN WORLD OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON #W (WX#_) (“[T]he power Natives wielded, the resistance they mounted, and the
diplomatic influence they exerted exposed the limits of federal power, aggravated tensions
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was replaced in short order by a diminished status amidst a feverish push for
westward expansion and Indian subjugation.20 Indian tribes were demoted
from fully sovereign entities to quasi-sovereign groups divested of their
right to freely convey21 and exclusively police their lands,22 as well as any
cogent claim to foreign status.23 Though tribal members had occupied vast
expanses of the territorial United States,24 tribal property was relegated to
reservations25 and subsequently parceled off to a disastrous effect26 in the
name of dissolving tribes and integrating their members within the broader
confines of states.27

between federal and state governments, fueled divisions between East and West, and threatened
to fragment the nation Washington was building.”).
20 See Indian Removal Act, ch. #]_, ] Stat. ]## (#_%X) (codified as amended at W$ U.S.C.
§ #P] (WX#W)) (authorizing the exchange of tribal lands within state borders for unoccupied
land in formerly unorganized territories).
21 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, W# U.S. (_ Wheat.) $]%, $Y# (#_W%) (holding that Indian
inhabitants are occupants entitled to protection in the possession of their lands but incapable of
transferring absolute title to others).
22 United States v. Rogers, ]$ U.S. (] How.) $OP, $PW (#_$O) (“Congress may by law punish
any offence committed [on tribal land], no matter whether the offender be a white man or an
Indian.”).
23 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, %X U.S. ($ Pet.) #, WX (#_%#) (“[A]n Indian tribe or nation
within the United States is not a foreign state in the sense of the Constitution and cannot maintain
an action in the courts of the United States.”).
24 In the early years of the republic, Indian nations occupied at least half of the lands
claimed by the states and North America’s other colonial inhabitants. See Brian Delay,
Independent Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War, ##W AM. HIST. REV. %$, O_ (WXXP) (“By the
early #_WXs, more than a dozen generations after Columbus, indigenous polities still
controlled between half and three-quarters of the continental landmass claimed by the
hemisphere’s remaining colonies and newly independent states.”).
25 See Bethany R. Berger, “Power Over this Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian
Law in United States v. Rogers, ]$ WM. & MARY L. REV. #Y$P, WX#P (WXX]) (“This policy
concentrated tribes on small reservations and appointed Indian agents to ‘civilize’ them . . . .”).
26 See Hodel v. Irving, ]_# U.S. PX], PXP (#Y_P) (“The policy of allotment of Indian
lands quickly proved disastrous for the Indians.”); Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment:
Indian Property Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, $] VAND. L. REV. #$$Y, #$O%
(WXX#) (“[A]llotment replaced myriad functioning and evolving tribal property systems with
a single dysfunctional and unchanging system. . . . Most significantly, it destroyed tribes’
power to adapt their property laws to meet new social, economic, political, and ecological
conditions.”); Frickey, supra note #W, at ]$ (“Under the policy of allotment, Congress
deprived Indians of more than two-thirds of their land base between #__P and #Y%].”).
27 See, e.g., In re Kansas Indians, PW U.S. ($ Wall.) P%P, P$_ (#_OP) (describing the basis
of one treaty between the federal government and a tribe as “the separation of estates and
interests, [that] would so weaken the tribal organization as to effect its voluntary
abandonment, and, as a natural result, the incorporation of the Indians with the great body
of the people”); United States v. Clapox, %$ F. $P$, $PP (D. Or. #___) (portraying reservations
as government run incubators of Indians “for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and
aspirations which distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized man”).
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In the period following the Civil War, the federal government’s
assimilationist policies came to dominate,28 marking an abrupt end to a
treaty-based system through which tribes were primarily viewed by
Congress as political sovereigns.29 The Supreme Court often abetted these
efforts through largely permissive, vacillating conceptions of the federal
government’s power over American Indians and the land they occupied.30
A central component of that assimilationist movement was the system
of boarding schools created by Congress to strip American Indian children
of their cultural identities.31 The teachings of the schools, often anathema
to tribal customs and mores,32 were meant to facilitate cultural genocide33
and the removal of Indian children from the purview of their families and
tribes.34
28

See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, FIFTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT
COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ] (#__Y)
(advising that “tribal relations should be broken up, socialism destroyed, and the family and the
autonomy of the individual substituted”); Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does
the United States Maintain a Relationship?, OO NOTRE DAME L. REV. #]O#, #]O]-O$ (#YY#); see also
Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, #%W U. PA.
L. REV. #Y$, WX$-XO (#Y_]) (explaining the diverging rationales for tribal assimilation in the late
nineteenth century); Theodore Roosevelt’s First Annual Message to the Senate and House of
Representatives
(Dec.
%,
#YX#),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/WXO#_P
[https://perma.cc/N_MS-PLQT] (praising a recently enacted federal law as “a mighty pulverizing
engine to break up the tribal mass” and advocating for “[t]he marriage laws of the Indians [to] be
made the same as those of the whites”).
29 Act of Mar. %, #_P#, ch. #WX § #, #O Stat. $]], $OO (“[H]ereafter, no Indian nation or tribe
within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent
nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty . . . .”).
30 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, %X U.S. ($ Pet.) #, #P (#_%#) (noting that Indians
“occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect
in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of
pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”); Sarah
H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, _# TEX. L. REV. #, W$ (WXXW) (“From
its earliest decisions, the Supreme Court established that national power over Indians derived
in part from extraconstitutional, inherent powers relating to colonial discovery and the
Indians’ aboriginal status.”). But see generally Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and
Humanity: Reflections on the Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, %# ARIZ. L. REV.
WX% (#Y_Y) (casting doubt on the judicial presumptions which underlie federal Indian law).
31 See O’Brien, supra note W_, at #]O$.
32 See Angelique Eagle Woman & G. William Rice, American Indian Children and U.S. Policy,
#O TRIBAL L.J. #, ] (WX#O) (“Christian and government boarding schools subjected Indian children to
treatment at the polar opposite from the concept of respect and caring in Indigenous tribal society.”).
33 Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance, $# EMORY L.J. $_W, OXW (WXXW) (“The well-established
tradition of white-run boarding schools dates back to the #_XXs when Indian children were the
targets of blatant cultural genocide.”).
34 Lorie M. Graham, “The Past Never Vanishes”: A Contextual Critique of the Existing
Indian Family Doctrine, W% AM. INDIAN L. REV. #, #X (#YY_) (“[S]tarting with the colonial
missionaries, education became one of the most pernicious methods used to separate American
OF THE
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In addition to indoctrination, the schools endeavored to pacify Indian
children and their parents amidst growing hostilities between tribes and
the federal government.35 The government achieved these ends through
compulsion, threatening to withhold rations from Indian families whose
children did not attend school36—a practice sanctioned by Congress.37
According to the federal government’s own report, the schools were
“largely ineffective” at educating Indian children.38 But they did succeed
in devastating tribes and Indian families through a “psychological assault
on [Indian] identity” that pervaded “every aspect of boarding school
life.”39 In addition to pillorying Indian children for their cultural heritage,
the schools exposed their students to sordid living conditions40 and
violated numerous treaties through which the federal government had
guaranteed tribes adequate access to schools on their reservations.41 The
plight of Indian children subjected to those schools eventually reached
such a fever pitch that Congress sought to ban their forced enrollment. 42
During that same period, by federal mandate, Indian children were
relocated to white-owned farms in the East and Midwest where they were
similarly conditioned to shed their cultural identities.43 The Indian
Reorganization Act of #Y%] ostensibly sought to curb the forced
assimilation which had, until that time, defined the federal government’s
stance toward Indian existence.44 But that was followed by a period in
which further tribal destruction ensued, and formal ties with many tribes
were severed as states were granted criminal jurisdiction over tribal lands
for purposes of further bringing tribal members within the ambit of the
American system.45
Indian children from the influences of family and community and assimilate them into
mainstream society.”).
35 Daniel M. Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and Community Control, W$ STAN. L. REV. ]_Y, ]Y%
(#YP%).
36 Berger, supra note W$, at WX#P.
37 Act of Mar. %, #_Y%, ch. WXY, WP Stat. O#W, O%$.
38 INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION _ (#YW_).
39 Andrea A. Curcio, Civil Claims for Uncivilized Acts: Filing Suit Against the Government
for American Indian Boarding School Abuses, ] HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. ]$, OX (WXXO).
40 INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, supra note %_, at ##.
41 Curcio, supra note %Y, at $P.
42 Act of Mar. W, #_Y$ ch. #__, W_ Stat. YXO (“Hereinafter no Indian child shall be sent from
any Indian reservation to a school beyond the state or territory in which said reservation is
situated without the voluntary consent of the father or mother of such child.”).
43 Atwood, supra note %%, at OXW.
44 W$ U.S.C. §§ ]O#-PY (WX#W); see also Morton v. Mancari, $#P U.S. $%$, $$% (#YP])
(“Congress in #Y%] determined that proper fulfillment of its trust required turning over to Indians
a greater control of their own destinies. The overly paternalistic approach of prior years had
proved both exploitative and destructive of Indian interests.”).
45 O’Brien, supra note W_, at #]OO-OP.
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With the advent of the midcentury Civil Rights Movement, federal
policy toward American Indians shifted from one of forced assimilation
and tribal termination to that of support for Indian self-determination.46 In
#YP_, ICWA was enacted in the midst of that shift, a period in which the
federal government set upon a “new orientation” towards American
Indians.47
B. ICWA as Revolution: Shifting the Tide in Favor of Tribal Unification
At the time of ICWA’s enactment, “the American Indian child-welfare
crisis” had reached “massive proportions.”48 Surveys indicated that
between twenty-five and thirty-five percent of all American Indian
children had been separated from their families.49 Eighty-five percent of
Indian children removed from their homes and placed into foster care
were relocated to non-Indian homes.50 Those removals were
overwhelmingly a product of cultural biases and misconceptions about
American Indian family structures.51 According to testimony Congress
received prior to ICWA’s enactment, the “nontribal government
authorities” who extracted Indian children from their families had “no
basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises
underlying Indian life and childbearing.”52
46 Graham, supra note %], at WW-W%; see also Richard M. Nixon, President, U.S., Special
Message on Indian Affairs to the Congress of the U.S. (July _, #YPX) (“We must assure the Indian
that he can assume control of his own life without being separated involuntary from the tribal
group. And we must make it clear that Indians can become independent of Federal control
without being cut off from Federal concern and Federal support.”).
47 O’Brien, supra note W_, at #]OP.
48 Gaylene J. McCartney, The American Indian Child-Welfare Crisis: Cultural Genocide
or First Amendment Preservation, P COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. $WY, $%X (#YP$).
49 H.R. REP. NO. Y$-#%_O, at Y (#YP_).
50 David Woodward, The Rights of Reservation Parents and Children: Cultural Survival
or the Final Termination?, % AM. INDIAN L. REV. W#, WW (#YP$). Prior to the Act’s passage, “many
Indian families were unable to qualify as foster or adoptive families because they did not meet
standards ‘based on middle-class values,’ resulting in most Indian children being placed with
non-Indian families.” Allison Krause Elder, “Indian” as a Political Classification: Reading the
Tribe Back into the Indian Child Welfare Act, #% NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y ]#P, ]#_ (WX#_) (footnote
omitted).
51 Graham, supra note %], at W$.
52 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs & Pub. Lands of the Comm. on
Interior & Insular Affairs on S. ScSd, cd Session, Y$th Cong. #YX (#YP_) (statement of Calvin
Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of the Choctaw Indians and Member of the
National Tribal Chairmen’s Association). American Indian children remain overrepresented
in the American foster system today. See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT
JUDGES, DISPROPORTIONALITY RATES FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR IN FOSTER CARE $ tbl.#
(WX#$) (showing that American Indian children, along with their African American
counterparts, are the most disproportionately represented race of children in the foster care
system); see also Maylinn Smith, Where Have All the Children Gone? When Will They Ever
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ICWA was Congress’s response to this “growing crisis with respect to
the breakup of Indian families and the placement of Indian children, at an
alarming rate, with non-Indian foster or adoptive homes.”53 It was enacted
to shield American Indian families from unwarranted invasions into
familial autonomy and to provide tribes the power to make child welfare
decisions for Indian children subject to removal proceedings.
Acting pursuant to its “plenary power over Indian affairs,”54 Congress
deemed it “the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families” by enacting “minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their homes,” and their subsequent placement “in
foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique value of Indian
culture.”55 ICWA’s provisions stem from the premise that “there is no
resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of
Indian tribes than their children,”56 and provide procedural and substantive
protections for Indian children, their parents, and tribes in state court child
welfare proceedings.57 As such, ICWA represents a delicate balancing act
from a Congress unwilling to completely wrest control over Indian child

Learn?, in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT %X, at W]%, W]P
(Mathew L. M. Fletcher et al. eds., WXXY) (“Although helpful, evidently legislation alone
cannot eliminate the overrepresentation of Indian children in state social services systems.”).
53 H.R. REP. NO. Y$-#%_O, at #Y (#YP_). A report issued by the Senate committee considering
ICWA further explained that
[t]he separation of Indian children from their natural parents, especially their
placement in institutions or homes which do not meet their special needs, is socially
and culturally undesirable. For the child, such separation can cause a loss of identity
and self-esteem, and contributes directly to the unreasonably high rates among Indian
children for dropouts, alcoholism and drug abuse, suicides, and crime. For the parents,
such separation can cause a similar loss of self-esteem, aggravates the conditions
which initially give rise to the family breakup, and leads to a continued cycle of poverty
and despair.
S. REP. NO. Y$-$YP, at #-W (#YP_).
54 W$ U.S.C. § #YX#(#) (WX#W). The Supreme Court has described that plenary power, derived
from Article I, Section _ of the Constitution, as being “exercised by Congress from the
beginning.” Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, #_P U.S. $$%, $O$ (#YX%).
55 W$ U.S.C. § #YXW (WX#W). This culture-specific approach was in accord with testimony
received by Congress during its ICWA deliberations. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Indian Affairs & Pub. Lands of the Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs on S. ScSd, cd
Session, Y$th Cong. OO (#YP_) (statement of Goldie Denny, Director of Social Services,
Quinault Nation, Representing National Congress of American Indians) (“General child
welfare legislation, no matter how well meaning, does not address the unique legal, cultural
status of Indian people. Rather, [it] tend[s] to promulgate the existing problems.”).
56 W$ U.S.C. § #YX#(%) (WX#W).
57 ICWA is inapplicable to tribal court proceedings. Id. § #Y##.
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custody proceedings from state tribunals,58 but eerily cognizant of the
potential for bias which the continued, unregulated use of those tribunals
could portend.59
ICWA defines child custody proceedings to include foster care
placement, termination of parental rights proceedings, preadoptive
placements, and adoptions.60 For purposes of the Act, Indians are defined
as members of Indian tribes and Alaska Natives belonging to Regional
Corporations.61 An Indian child under the Act is an unmarried person
below the age of eighteen who is “either (a) a member of an Indian tribe
or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe.”62 ICWA defines “parent” to exclude
“the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or
established.”63

58 See H.R. REP. NO. Y$-#%_O, at #Y (#YP_) (“While the committee does not feel that it is
necessary or desirable to oust the States of their traditional jurisdiction over Indian children
falling within their geographic limits, it does feel the need to establish minimum Federal
standards and procedural safeguards in State Indian child custody proceedings . . . .”); Michael
C. Snyder, An Overview of the Indian Child Welfare Act, P ST. THOMAS L. REV. _#$, _WX (#YY$)
(“The purpose of the ICWA was to halt unwarranted state court removal of Indian children.”).
The recognition of the hostility of states toward their Indian inhabitants was by no means novel.
See United States v. Kagama, ##_ U.S. %P$, %_] (#__O) (“Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the States where [Indians] are found are often their deadliest enemies.”).
59 ICWA is explicit in its condemnation of states’ roles in effectuating the rupture of Indian
families. At the outset, it describes those removals as “often unwarranted” and charges states
with “fail[ing] to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and
social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.” W$ U.S.C. § #YX#(])-($) (WX#W).
60 Id. § #YX%(#). ICWA does not apply to juvenile delinquency placements or divorce
proceedings where custody of an Indian child is at issue. Id. But only juvenile delinquency
placements stemming from acts which, if committed by an adult, would be considered a crime,
are intended to be exempt from ICWA’s requirements. Id. However, many states appear to
exempt juvenile delinquency placement proceedings for Indian status offenders in contradiction
of the Act’s intended scope. See generally Thalia Gonzalez, Reclaiming the Promise of the
Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study of State Incorporation and Adoption of Legal Protections for
Indian Status Offenders, ]W N.M. L. REV. #%# (WX#W) (arguing that state courts failing to
consistently apply IWCA’s provisions regarding juvenile exemptions has resulted in an
undermining of IWCA itself).
61 W$ U.S.C. § #YX%(%) (WX#W). “In order for a child to be eligible for membership in any tribe,
the legal status of the child’s mother and father, as ‘parent’ and as tribal members, has to be
established.” Hollinger, supra note #X, at ]$_. But even then, ICWA is inapplicable where a child’s
parent is a tribal member, but their child does not qualify for tribal membership. Snyder, supra note
$_, at _W#-WW.
62 W$ U.S.C. § #YX%(]) (WX#W). Accordingly, when American Indian children are tribal
members or eligible for tribal membership, any state court child custody proceeding concerning
them is subject to ICWA’s provisions even where the child’s American Indian heritage solely
stems from their biological father and that father is not considered a “parent” under ICWA
because he has not acknowledged or established paternity.
63 Id. § #YX%(Y).
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ICWA also provides Indian tribes exclusive jurisdiction over child
custody proceedings concerning Indian children “who reside[] or [are]
domiciled within” their reservation.64 When an Indian child is not
domiciled or residing within the reservation of their tribe and is subject to
a state court foster care placement or a termination of parental rights
proceeding, ICWA compels state courts to transfer the proceeding to the
tribe in the absence of good cause65 and parental objections.66 It also allows
for Indian custodians and tribes to intervene in state court proceedings
dealing with the foster care placements and terminations of parental rights
to Indian children.67 For involuntary state court proceedings, ICWA
requires state courts to “notify the parent or Indian custodian and the
Indian child’s tribe” in cases “where the court knows or has reason to know
that an Indian child is involved” in the proceeding.68 Most importantly for
purposes of this Comment, ICWA provides Indian parents a bevy of
procedural protections intended to safeguard parent–child relationships
from state interference.
Among those protections is the right to court-appointed counsel for
indigent Indian custodians and parents in a “removal, placement or
termination proceeding.”69 ICWA also provides for a considerable degree
64 Id. § #Y##(a). In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the Supreme Court
held “that the law of domicile Congress used in the ICWA cannot be one that permits individual
reservation-domiciled tribal members to defeat the tribe’s exclusive jurisdiction by the simple
expedient of giving birth and placing the child for adoption off the reservation.” ]YX U.S. %X, $%
(#Y_Y).
65 The good cause exception to the transfer requirement quickly became one of ICWA’s
most controversial provisions, with commentators alleging that it allowed state courts to impute
their biases into Indian child welfare proceedings. See, e.g., Catherine Brooks, The Indian Child
Welfare Act in Nebraska: Fifteen Years, A Foundation for the Future, WP CREIGHTON L. REV.
OO#, O_P-Y# (#YY]) (describing a Nebraska court’s use of the good cause exception as a judgment
concerning the adequacy of the tribal court system making the transfer request).
66 W$ U.S.C. § #Y##(b); see also Laverne F. Hill, Comment, Family Group Conferencing:
An Alternative Approach to the Placement of Alaska Native Children Under the Indian Child
Welfare Act, WW ALASKA L. REV. _Y, #X] (WXX$) (“Even though tribes have the right to be notified
of proceedings involving children of the tribe and to remove the proceedings to tribal court, the
underlying philosophy that governs these proceedings is adversarial and culturally insensitive.”).
67 W$ U.S.C. § #Y##(c).
68 Id. § #Y#W(a). Federal regulations require the notice to provide the personal identification
information of the child’s “direct lineal ancestors.” W$ C.F.R. § W%.###(d)(%) (WX#_). However,
ICWA does not provide for a tribal right to notice in voluntary proceedings, but “[m]any states
themselves have enacted laws requiring notice in voluntary proceedings so as to protect the
tribe’s right of intervention.” Atwood, supra note %%, at O#] n.##X.
69 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(b). States receiving federal child abuse prevention and treatment
funding are required to provide representatives for children involved in state court abuse and
neglect proceedings, but not all states guarantee representation for parents involved in parental
rights termination proceedings. See Amy E. Halbrook, Custody: Kids, Counsel and the
Constitution, #W DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y #PY, #Y# (WX#P) (“Counsel or a guardian ad
litem is appointed on a discretionary basis in these matters, in particular in contested matters
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of protection in the substantive standard by which foster care and parental
rights termination proceedings are adjudged under the Act. When a state
seeks to effectuate foster care placement of an Indian child, it is required
to make “a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence . . .
that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”70 For
parental rights termination proceedings, the applicable standard is beyond
a reasonable doubt.71 This standard is a higher burden of proof than that
typically set forth for parents of children who are not Indian.72
Before placing an Indian child in foster care or attempting to terminate
that child’s parental rights, ICWA also requires active efforts to prevent the
dissolution of Indian families.73 However, the active efforts requirement is
inapplicable to the attempted termination of parental rights of unwed
biological fathers of Indian children who have not “acknowledged or
established” their paternity pursuant to § #YX%(Y).74 When a party has made
such efforts to no avail, ICWA provides adoption preferences for members
of the child’s extended family,75 members of the child’s tribe, and other
where the suitability of the adoptive placement is questioned or where the child’s best interests
are otherwise at issue.”).
70 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(e).
71 Id. § #Y#W(f).
72 See, e.g., Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Firlet (In re Miller), ]$# N.W.Wd $PO (Mich. Ct. App. #YYX)
(rejecting an equal protection challenge brought by a parent of a non-Indian child who objected to
her parental rights being terminated under a lesser standard than that applied to parents of Indian
children under ICWA); see also Santosky v. Kramer, ]$$ U.S. P]$, P$_ (#Y_W) (holding that the
standard of proof in a termination proceeding must be greater than a preponderance of the evidence
standard).
73 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(d). This section “applies only in cases where an Indian family’s
‘breakup’ would be precipitated by the termination of the parent’s rights.” Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P, O$# (WX#%). Additionally, “[b]efore a child can be placed in accordance
with ICWA’s placement preferences, the state has to identify the child as being subject to the
law.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-X$-WYX, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT:
EXISTING INFORMATION ON IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES COULD BE USED TO TARGET GUIDANCE
AND ASSISTANCE TO STATES #O (WXX$).
74 A.A. v. Dep’t of Family & Youth Servs., Y_W P.Wd W$O, WOW (Alaska #YYY).
75 ICWA defines extended family through either tribal law and custom or as “the Indian child’s
grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or
second cousin, or stepparent,” provided that they are at least eighteen years old. W$ U.S.C. § #YX%(W)
(WX#W). As such, an unwed father who has not acknowledged or established his paternity may not be
eligible for placement. But see Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at OOP (Breyer, J., concurring) (questioning
if ICWA provisions, among them § #Y#$(a), “allow an absentee father to reenter the special statutory
order of preference with support from the tribe”). Section #Y#O(a) permits “a biological parent” to
“petition for return of custody.” W$ U.S.C. § #Y#O(a) (WX#W). However, “return of custody” implies the
need for a preexisting custodial relationship, meaning that a biological father who has not
acknowledged or established his paternity may also not be eligible for relief under this provision.
Such a reading would be consistent with the Court’s interpretation of § #Y#W(f) in Adoptive Couple,
discussed further in Part II.
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Indian families.76 For foster care and preadoptive placements, ICWA’s
preferences are similar, with an additional preference for Indian foster
homes licensed or approved by an Indian child’s tribe.77 ICWA also allows
for the placement preferences of parents to factor into placement
determinations.78 But ICWA does not permit unwed fathers who have not
acknowledged or established their paternity to challenge their child’s
placement for violating ICWA’s provisions.79 Accordingly, an unwed
father’s ability to assert rights under ICWA is tethered to his ability to
demonstrate that he has acknowledged or established paternity of his
biological child.
II. SECTION #YX%(Y) AND ADOPTIVE COUPLE
This Part considers the definition of “parent” as defined by state courts
interpreting § #YX%(Y). It then considers the Supreme Court’s approach, or
lack thereof, to the same statutory quandary, analyzing the interpretational
tools utilized by the Court with a particular focus on their utility for
interpreting § #YX%(Y) moving forward.
A. State Court Interpretation
Though a federal law, ICWA is primarily a creature of state court
jurisprudence.80 State courts sculpt the metes and bounds of ICWA
largely free of federal court input. In ICWA’s four-decade existence,
the Supreme Court has decided only two cases concerning the Act
despite myriad differences in state courts’ interpretations. Among the
most glaring and consequential are the different frameworks state

76 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#$(a) (WX#W). “These preferences for nonmember Indians can be understood
. . . as some acknowledgment that tribal government boundaries in the United States today do not
necessarily reflect cultural dividing lines.” Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, ]Y UCLA L. REV.
#%P%, #%_# (WXXW). But § #Y#$(a)’s preferences “do[] not bar a non-Indian family . . . from adopting an
Indian child when no other eligible candidates have sought to adopt the child.” Adoptive Couple, $PX
U.S. at O]W.
77 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#$(a).
78 Id. § #Y#$(c).
79 See id. § #Y#] (providing that “any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody such
[an Indian] child was removed, and the Indian child’s tribe may petition any court of competent
jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of
sections #Y##, #Y#W, and #Y#% of this title” (emphasis added)).
80 See Kathryn Fort & Adrian T. Smith, Indian Child Welfare Act Annual Case Law
Update and Commentary, A M. INDIAN L.J., May ##, WX#_, at %W, ]# (“Prior to WX#$, virtually
no ICWA cases were filed in federal court.”).
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courts have developed for determining whether an unwed father has
attained “parent” status under § #YX%(Y).81
The varied approaches to interpreting § #YX%(Y) in the cases of unwed
fathers is reflective of the varied circumstances in which unwed fathers
invoking ICWA’s protections in child custody proceedings appear before
state courts.82 Many of those courts have taken plain language approaches
to interpreting “acknowledged or established,” permitting unwed fathers
to satisfy § #YX%(Y)’s requirements by taking paternity tests,83 claiming
paternity during child custody proceedings,84 and through acts construed
to connote the assumption of paternal responsibilities.85 But other courts
have taken the opposite approach, rejecting the use of paternity tests to
establish paternity86 and concluding that a putative father’s
acknowledgement of paternity to family members is insufficient to
constitute acknowledgment under the Act.87 Courts have also varied in
defining the temporal dimension of their § #YX%(Y) analyses. Fathers have
been held to qualify as parents under the Act following years of absence

81 See Christopher Deluzio, Tribes and Race: The Court’s Missed Opportunity in Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl, ]$ PACE L. REV. $XY, $W# (WX#]) (“There has been silence in the academic
discourse surrounding this disagreement among the states about how to define paternity under
the ICWA. Regardless, this split affects a large portion of the nation’s Indian population and has
muddied the waters for putative Indian fathers affected by . . . termination or adoption
proceedings.”).
82 Despite their diverging approaches to determining whether a putative father has
“acknowledged or established” his paternity, state courts appear unanimous in noting that paternity
cannot be established in accord with ICWA when a biological father is unknown or has made no
claim of paternity. See, e.g., Hampton v. J.A.L., O$_ So.Wd %%#, %%O, %%% (La. #YY$) (noting that an
Indian child’s paternity “ha[d] not been conclusively established” in a case where “[t]he alleged
father has had no contact with the child”); In re N.R., No. WX#O-PP, WX#O WL $%]]X%Y, at *#] (Vt.
WX#O) (noting that paternity “had not been established” in a case where the biological father’s
identity was unknown).
83 See, e.g., In re J.S., %W# P.%d #X%, #XY (Mont. WX#]); Noah v. Kelly B., OP P.%d %$Y,
%OP (Okla. Civ. App. WXX%).
84 See, e.g., In re I.M. & M., No. WY$XYW, WX#X WL WX#O%WO, at *O n.% (Mich. Ct. App.
May WX, WX#X) (“At the time of the preliminary hearing, I.M.’s father had not yet established
parentage, but did so later in the proceedings.”).
85 See, e.g., Leatherman v. Yancey, #X% P.%d #XYY, ##X_ n.W] (Okla. WXX]) (“[E]vidence
reflects that the father met the minimal statutory requirements by grasping his parental rights
and exercising his parental duties to the extent of his ability.”).
86 See In re Michael J., No. A#X%#Y_, WXX] WL $$#W$#, at *#O (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. WW, WXX])
(“The language of the ICWA suggests that something more than a blood test result is necessary
for an unwed father to ‘acknowledge or establish’ his paternity.”).
87 See In re Adoption of Child of Indian Heritage, $]% A.Wd YW$, Y%%-%] (N.J. #Y__) (“Although
petitioners contend that [the putative father’s] alleged claims of paternity to members of his family
prior to the birth of the child constitute an acknowledgment of paternity under the ICWA, we
disagree.”).
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in their children’s lives.88 Conversely, they have also been barred from
asserting rights under ICWA as a “parent” due to years of paternal
absence.89 Other courts have avoided defining “acknowledged or
established” entirely.90
When state courts have strayed from interpretations of the “plain
terms”91 of § #YX%(Y), they have largely chosen to either impart their
state’s paternity establishment procedures into the Act or fashion a new
standard solely applicable to ICWA. Five states—California, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Arizona—incorporate state law.92 These courts
88 See, e.g., In re Morgan, %O] N.W.Wd P$], P$$, P$_ (Mich. Ct. App. #Y_$) (holding that a
putative father, unwed to the child’s mother at the time of the child’s birth and for more than two
years afterwards, had “reestablished” his relationship with his child by regularly visiting him at his
foster home); In re J.S., %W# P.%d at #XY, ### (holding that a putative father, who first visited his son
during a state-facilitated meeting when he was eight years old, had established paternity of his child
under § #YX%(Y)).
89 See, e.g., In re S.A.M., PX% S.W.Wd OX%, OXP (Mo. Ct. App. #Y_O) (assuming that a father
who claimed paternity through acknowledgment expressed in a court motion was a “parent”
under ICWA, but holding that § #Y#W(f) was inapplicable because the putative father “never had
custody” of his child). Notably, this same interpretive approach was utilized by the Supreme
Court in Adoptive Couple, as will be discussed in Section II.B.
90 See, e.g., Div. of Family Servs. v. S. R., No. XW-%]]]], WXX] Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS ##$,
at *]# (noting that “acknowledge[ment]” of paternity is “a requirement for the establishment
of a parent-child relationship for purposes of qualification under the Indian Child Welfare Act,”
but not describing what acknowledgment entails).
91 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, P%# S.E.Wd $$X, $OX (S.C. WX#W), rev’d, $PX U.S. O%P
(WX#%).
92 See Jared P. v. Glade T., WXY P.%d #$P, #O# (Ariz. Ct. App. WXXY) (“[W]e look to state law
to determine whether paternity has been acknowledged or established.”); In re Daniel M., #
Cal. Rptr. %d _YP, _YY (Cal. Ct. App. WXX%) (explaining that California’s paternity establishment
law “is substantively indistinguishable from” § #YX%(Y)); Child of Indian Heritage, $]% A.Wd at
Y%$ (“Congress intended to defer to state or tribal law standards for establishing paternity
. . . .”); In re Baby Boy D., P]W P.Wd #X$Y, #XO] (Okla. #Y_$) (interpreting § #YX%(Y) “to mean
acknowledged or established through the procedures available through the tribal courts,
consistent with tribal customs, or through procedures established by state law”), cert denied,
]_] U.S. #XPW (#Y__), overruled on other grounds by Leatherman v. Yancey, #X% P.%d #XYY, ##X#
(Okla. WXX]); In re Morgan, No. XWAX#-YOX_-CH-XXWXO, #YYP WL P#O__X, at *#P (Tenn. Ct.
App. Nov. #Y, #YYP) (adopting the interpretation of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in In re
Baby Boy D.); Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, YXO S.W.Wd #$W, #P% (Tex. Ct. App. #YY$)
(“Congress intended to have the issue of acknowledgment or establishment of paternity
determined by state law.”). At least one commentator has described South Carolina as one of
the states that “do not look to their state laws when determining whether paternity has been
‘acknowledged’ or ‘established’ under the ICWA.” Deluzio, supra note _#, at $W#. This
contention is premised on the South Carolina Supreme Court’s purported rejection of an
interpretation of § #YX%(Y) dictated by state law. Id. at $]#. However, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has not definitively resolved this question. In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
the court noted that a party’s state law incorporation contention conflated paternity and paternal
consent to adoption. P%# S.E.Wd at $OX. It did not, however, conclusively reject the conflation.
Rather, it resolved the paternity issue in question by stating that the unwed putative father had
satisfied the “plain terms” of § #YX%(Y) “by both acknowledging his paternity through the
pursuit of court proceedings . . . and establishing his paternity through DNA testing.” Id.
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have held that Congress effectively ceded the terrain of paternity
definition in ICWA to the states by not defining “acknowledged or
established.” Of those five, three—New Jersey, Oklahoma, and
Tennessee—also permit the incorporation of tribal law.93 Alaska and Utah
both utilize flexible standards disconnected from state law to determine
whether an unwed father is a parent under ICWA.94 The “acknowledged
or established” definitions they have fashioned are amorphous standards
of “reasonableness” intended to extend judicial flexibility to courts faced
with sympathetic fathers seeking to invoke ICWA’s machinery.95
Fittingly, a lack of sympathy appeared to animate the Supreme Court’s
decision when faced with the same issue.
B. Section STUV(T) Following Adoptive Couple
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Supreme Court’s sole foray into
interpreting § #YX%(Y), provides the best support for why a federal
standard is needed to govern the meaning of “acknowledged or
established.” But despite granting certiorari to determine whether
“parent” includes an unwed father who has not complied with state
paternity law, the Court avoided answering that question.96 Their method
of doing so—seemingly adopting a framework of paternity principles
established in a string of earlier family law cases—reveals the lens
through which fatherhood, in the context of ICWA, should be refracted.
In Adoptive Couple, an unwed American Indian father (“Biological
Father”) sought custody of his child (“Baby Girl”) with a non-Indian
woman (“Birth Mother”) after previously renouncing claims to custody,
and after she arranged for the child to be adopted. Biological Father, an
93 Child of Indian Heritage, $]% A.Wd at Y%$; Baby Boy D., P]W P.Wd at #XO]; Morgan,
#YYP WL P#O__X, at *#P.
94 Bruce L. v. W.E., W]P P.%d YOO, YPY (Alaska WX##) (“[T]o qualify as an ICWA parent an
unwed father does not need to comply perfectly with state laws for establishing paternity, so
long as he has made reasonable efforts to acknowledge paternity.”); E.T. v. R.K.B. (In re B.B.),
]#P P.%d #, W# (Utah WX#P) (“We reject the notion that courts should rely on state law to determine
whether an unmarried biological father has acknowledged or established paternity under
ICWA.”).
95 The durability of these standards in comparison to the more rigid and routine
application of state law is unclear. Even where courts are ostensibly receptive to actions of
paternity acknowledgment and establishment not recognized by state law, state law remains
the fulcrum through which acknowledgment and establishment are conceptualized. This is
most evident in Arizona, where state courts have held that the filing of state paternity actions
or pursuit of legal custody “are not required,” Michael J. v. Michael J., Sr., P P.%d YOX, YO%
(Ariz. Ct. App. WXXX), despite the general application of “state law to determine whether
paternity has been acknowledged or established.” Jared P., WXY P.%d at #O#.
96 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P, O]O (WX#%) (“We need not—and
therefore do not—decide whether Biological Father is a ‘parent.’”).
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enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation, was on active duty with the
United States Army and stationed in Oklahoma, roughly four hours away
from Birth Mother, when she informed him one month into their
engagement that she was pregnant.97 Following the announcement, their
relationship became strained due to Biological Father’s insistence that they
get married prior to Baby Girl’s birth.98 Approximately four months after
announcing her pregnancy, Birth Mother ended their engagement, after
which Biological Father made no attempts to contact her.99 Three
months before their child was born, Birth Mother asked Biological
Father whether “he would rather pay child support or surrender his
parental rights.”100 He chose the latter, but he later testified that he
understood his response to indicate that he was surrendering his rights
to Biological Mother, allowing her time to think and for the potential
rekindling of their relationship.101
Birth Mother then proceeded to contact a private adoption agency and
selected a non-Indian married couple (“Adoptive Couple”) to adopt Baby
Girl.102 The couple “provided financial assistance to Mother during the
final months of her pregnancy and after Baby Girl’s birth.”103 During that
same period, Biological Father provided no support.104 However,
Biological Father was unaware that Birth Mother arranged for Baby Girl’s
adoption, and he “insist[ed] that, had he known this, he would have never
considered relinquishing his rights.”105 Biological Father was similarly
unaware of Baby Girl’s birth.106 When Birth Mother went into labor, she
requested that the hospital not report her admittance.107 She “signed forms
relinquishing her parental rights and consenting to the adoption” the
following day.108 But in doing so, she identified Baby Girl as only Hispanic

97
98

Id. at O]%.
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, P%# S.E.Wd $$X, $$% (S.C. WX#W). Birth Father testified
that he wanted to marry Birth Mother prior to their daughter’s birth so that Baby Girl would
not be born out of wedlock. Id. at $$% n.%.
99 Id. at $$%.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See id. (“It is undisputed that Mother and Father did not live together prior to the baby’s
birth and that Father did not support Mother financially for pregnancy related expenses, even
though he had the ability to provide some degree of financial assistance to Mother.”).
105 Id.
106 He was, however, “aware of Mother’s expected due date.” Id. at $$$.
107 Id. at $$]. According to Birth Mother, this was to prevent contact with the father and
had been her practice in previous births. Id. at $$] n.P.
108 Id. at $$].
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despite being aware of Father’s Cherokee heritage.109 By omitting Baby
Girl’s Indian heritage, Birth Mother prevented the Cherokee Nation from
objecting under Oklahoma law to Baby Girl’s removal from the state by
Adoptive Couple.110
The omission of Baby Girl’s Indian ancestry and its ramifications fit a
pattern in the months preceding and following Baby Girl’s birth. Birth
Mother was initially reluctant to reveal Biological Father’s tribal
membership to the adoption agency.111 Adoptive Couple were even
unaware of Baby Girl’s eligibility for tribal enrollment when Birth Mother
relinquished her parental rights.112 Upon being informed of Biological
Father’s Indian status, the lawyer retained by Adoptive Couple on
Biological Mother’s behalf sent a letter to the Cherokee Nation to confirm
Biological Father’s tribal enrollment.113 However, the letter misspelled
Biological Father’s name and misstated his birthdate, leaving the
Cherokee Nation unable to verify his enrollment.114
Biological Father only became aware of Baby Girl’s removal to South
Carolina and her pending adoption four months after her birth when he
was presented with adoption papers by a process server hired by Adoptive
Couple days before his scheduled deployment to Iraq.115 The “Acceptance
of Service Form” signed by Biological Father stated that he was not
contesting Baby Girl’s adoption.116 Biological Father thought that he was
signing over parental rights to Biological Mother and “did not realize that
he consented to Baby Girl’s adoption by another family until after he
signed the papers. Upon realizing that [Biological] Mother had
relinquished her [parental] rights to [Adoptive Couple],” Biological Father
attempted to grab the papers from the process server who warned him that

109 Id. Birth Mother is “predominantly Hispanic,” Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S.
O%P, O]% (WX#%), and “testified that she believed she also had Cherokee heritage, but she was not
a registered member of the Cherokee Nation.” Adoptive Couple, P%# S.E.Wd at $$] n.$. The
Nation, like many other tribes, makes its citizenship determinations “based on descent from
historic membership rolls.” Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race,
and the Constitutional Minimum, OY STAN. L. REV. ]Y#, $##-#W (WX#P). Despite Birth Mother’s
nonmember Cherokee status, ICWA was still applicable due to Baby Girl’s eligibility for
membership in the Cherokee Nation. Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O]W n.#; see also supra note
OW and accompanying text.
110 Adoptive Couple, P%# S.E.Wd at $$$ n._. The Cherokee Nation did not become aware of
Baby Girl’s Indian status under ICWA until four months after her birth. Id. at $$$.
111 Id. at $$].
112 Id. at $$$.
113 Id. at $$].
114 Id.
115 Id. at $$$.
116 Id.
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he would go to jail if he damaged the documents.117 Biological Father then
consulted a lawyer and intervened in the South Carolina adoption
proceeding the next day.118 A court-ordered paternity test later
conclusively established that Baby Girl was Biological Father’s
offspring.119 The family court then determined that ICWA applied to the
adoption proceedings and, following a trial, denied Adoptive Couple’s
adoption petition upon a finding that ICWA’s requirements had not been
satisfied.120 Custody of Baby Girl was then transferred to Biological Father
approximately twenty-seven months after her birth.
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. Despite acknowledging
that “ICWA does not explicitly set forth a procedure for an unwed father
to acknowledge or establish paternity,” it concluded that Biological
Father was a “parent” under the Act because he established his paternity
through DNA testing and acknowledged it by pursuing custody of his
daughter after becoming aware of the pending adoption proceedings.121
It further held that the consent of Biological Father in signing the
“Acceptance of Service” form violated § #Y#%(a)’s requirement that
voluntary terminations of parental rights be recorded before and certified
by a judge.122 Under its analysis, the proposed adoption also violated
ICWA’s procedures for involuntary termination of parental rights. The
state supreme court found that Adoptive Couple had failed to satisfy
§ #Y#W(d)’s requirement of the exhaustion of active efforts to prevent the
dissolution of an Indian family.123 Moreover, the court found transfer of
custody to the father in accord with the Act’s core purpose of
“preserv[ing] American Indian culture by retaining its children within
the tribe.”124
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held, assuming for purposes
of the argument that Biological Father was a “parent” under § #YX%(Y),125
that §§ #Y#W(d) and (f) did not “bar[] the termination of his parental
rights” because he never had custody over his child.126 The Court
reasoned that § #Y#W(f)’s reference to “the continued custody of the child
by the parent”127 “refers to custody that a parent already has (or at least
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at $$O.
Id. at $OX.
Id. at $O#.
Id. at $OW.
Id. at $OO.
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P, O]O-]P (WX#%).
Id. at O]P.
W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(f) (WX#W).
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had at some point in the past).”128 Because Biological Father never had
custody prior to the adoption proceedings, § #Y#W(f)’s requirement of a
“determination” of “likely . . . serious emotional or physical damage to
the child”129 was irrelevant. The Court similarly reasoned that “when an
Indian parent abandons an Indian child prior to birth and that child has
never been in the Indian parent’s legal or physical custody . . . the
‘breakup of the Indian family’ has long since occurred and § #Y#W(d) is
inapplicable.”130
The Adoptive Couple Court’s statutory analysis was consistent with its
understanding of the Act’s core purpose. In the Court’s view, the “removal
of Indian children from Indian families’ was “the primary mischief”
ICWA was intended to curb.131 But because no Indian family existed here,
the goal of the Act was not implicated and Biological Father’s status as a
“parent” could not afford him the right to the substantive protections
provided in §§ #Y#W(d) and (f).132 The Court further explained that it was
hesitant to apply § #Y#W(d)’s requirement of “remedial services and
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family”133 in this case out of a concern that “it would surely dissuade some
[prospective adoptive parents] from seeking to adopt Indian children.”134

128
129
130

Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O]_.
W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(f) (WX#W).
Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O$#-$W. The Court’s reasoning here likely applies no matter
the status of a parent as “Indian” under the Act. See W$ U.S.C. § #YX%(%) (WX#W) (defining “Indian”
as “any person who is a member of an Indian tribe or who is an Alaska Native and a member of
a Regional Corporation”). Despite the Court’s use of the term “Indian parent” in its discussion
of § #Y#W(d), a parent need not be Indian to have protected rights under the Act. Rather, for ICWA
to apply in a child custody proceeding, the proceeding need only involve an Indian child as
defined by § #YX%(]). S.S. v. Stephanie H., %__ P.%d $OY, $P] (Ariz. Ct. App. WX#P); Michelle L.
Lehmann, Note, The Indian Child Welfare Act of STfg: Does it Apply to the Adoption of an
Illegitimate Child?, %_ CATH. U. L. REV. $##, $]X (#Y_Y).
131 Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O]Y.
132 Id.; see also id. at O$# n.P (“Congress did not extend the heightened protections of
§§ #Y#W(d) and (f) to all biological fathers.”).
133 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(d) (WX#W).
134 Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O$%. The Court cast § #Y#W(d)’s requirement as a “sensible”
one for state-employed social workers and implicitly endorsed its fulfillment by tribes. Id. at O$%,
O$% n.Y. However, the text of § #Y#W(d) does not make any distinctions with regards to the entities
or individuals subject to its requirements. Rather, it imparts the duty of proving that unsuccessful
“active efforts . . . to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent
the breakup of the Indian family” have taken place on “[a]ny party seeking to effect a foster care
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child.” W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(d) (WX#W)
(emphasis added).
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The ruling effectively made it so that “race (as manifested by biology)
is insufficient to grant a parent access to ICWA’s protections.”135 As such,
it marked “a shift in ICWA jurisprudence from a notion of parenthood as
rooted in biology to one requiring physical or legal custody, or,
alternatively, a social relationship beyond mere genetic relatedness.”136
This reasoning is consonant with the Court’s holdings in a string of cases
challenging state laws cabining the rights of unwed fathers.137 In those
cases, the Court has articulated a standard requiring unwed fathers to
demonstrate more than just biological ties to their children in order to
claim parental rights.138 Reading the Adoptive Couple decision as an
extension of this doctrine provides the proper vehicle through which to
situate a standard definition of “acknowledged or established” under
§ #YX%(Y).
III. BIOLOGY PLUS AND THE UNWED FATHER
Questions of parental identity are not explicitly solved by the text of the
Constitution. At common law, biological fathers had no right to assert

135 Shreya A. Fadia, Note, Adopting “Biology Plus” in Federal Indian Law: Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl’s Refashioning of ICWA’s Framework, ##] COLUM. L. REV. WXXP, WX]%
(WX#]).
136 Id. at WXW]. Indeed, a fear that “the Act would put certain vulnerable children at a great
disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even a remote one—was an Indian,” permeates the
Court’s opinion. Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O$$. The Court’s multiple references to Baby Girl’s
“%/W$O Cherokee” heritage, id. at O]O, and its conclusion that “equal protection concerns,” id. at
O$O, militated against a contrary ruling have been understood “as inviting a broader constitutional
challenge to the Act under a theory of racial discrimination.” Elder, supra note $X, at ]%%. But see
Fadia, supra note #%$, at WX#_ n._] (“The Court’s recognition of Baby Girl’s eligibility for
membership and ICWA’s applicability to the case indicates that its discomfort did not determine
its decision.”). Regardless, the permissibility of ICWA’s framework under the equal protection
principles embedded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment necessarily implicates
the continued validity of the Court’s declaration in Morton v. Mancari that “legislative judgments”
providing “special treatment” for Indians that can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’
unique obligations towards the Indians . . . will not be disturbed.” ]#P U.S. $%$, $$$ (#YP]). This
issue—which continues to be litigated and to attract the attention of commentators—is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
137 See The Supreme Court, cUSc Term – Leading Cases, #WP HARV. L. REV. #Y_, %P% (WX#%)
(“Read as a dispute over biology versus care, the case then fits squarely in the parental rights
jurisprudence preceding it, continuing the Court’s trend toward provisional prioritization of
family over biology.”).
138 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_, W$Y-OX (#Y_%) (noting a “clear distinction
between a mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental responsibility”).
This concept of paternity rights has curried favor with commentators who similarly believe that
a biological connection alone is insufficient to fortify a claim of paternal rights. See, e.g., Nancy
E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, #] WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. YXY, Y#P (WXXO) (“Fatherhood should be defined as the conduct of nurturing children.”).

WX#Y]

ICWA and the Unwed Father

#$%$

claims of legal paternity over their biological children.139 Paternity, as a
legal concept, was granted to men through marriage to their wives and an
irrefutable presumption that their wives’ children were biologically—and
legally—their own.140 Under the traditional marital presumption, an unwed
male who fathers a child with a married woman was barred from legally
claiming paternity of his biological child.141 But with the advent of new
constitutional protections of privacy and autonomy, the right to parenthood
for unwed fathers gained constitutional protection.142 Stanley v. Illinois
marked the Supreme Court’s first grant of constitutional protection to the
parental rights of unwed fathers, a striking shift from the common law
tradition.143
In Stanley, the Court considered whether “a presumption that
distinguishes and burdens all unwed fathers [is] constitutionally
repugnant.”144 Peter Stanley, Sr. lived with Joan Stanley, the mother of his
children, on and off for eighteen years.145 Upon her death, two of their
children were placed with a court-appointed married couple.146 Unmarried
men were excluded from the definition of “parent” under the Illinois statute
with which Stanley’s children were determined to be of “dependent” status
following their mother’s death.147 Accordingly, no determination of
Stanley’s fitness as a parent was made prior to the placement of his children

139 Michael H. v. Gerald D., ]Y# U.S. ##X, #W] (#Y_Y) (plurality opinion); Traci Dallas, Note,
Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, __ COLUM. L. REV. %OY,
%PX (#Y__).
140 See Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the
Marital Presumption, O$ MD. L. REV. W]O, W]_-]Y (WXXO) (explaining the rationales for the
marital presumption of paternity—which Congress implicitly transmuted to ICWA through
its definition of “parent”—as “provid[ing] legal certainty for purposes such as inheritance
and succession,” “preserv[ing] the integrity of marriage, at least where both parties to the
marriage so desired,” and “promot[ing] the welfare of the children”).
141 See Joan C. Sylvain, Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Presumption of Paternity, %Y
CATH. U. L. REV. _%#, _%P-%_ (#YYX) (explaining the marital presumption in the context of a California
statute).
142 See David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, $] AM. J. COMP. L. #W$, #W_ (WXXO) (“Before
the #YPXs, unmarried fathers had only the most tenuous legal rights concerning their children.”).
143 ]X$ U.S. O]$ (#YPW).
144 Id. at O]Y. Four years prior to deciding Stanley, the Court invalidated a state law that
barred children born out of wedlock from filing wrongful death actions stemming from their
parents’ deaths. Levy v. Louisiana, %Y# U.S. O_, PW (#YO_). Reflecting on that case in Stanley,
the Court noted that “familial bonds” among family members whose matriarch and patriarch
are not married “were often as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a more
formally organized family unit.” ]X$ U.S. at O$#-$W.
145 Stanley, ]X$ U.S. at O]O.
146 In re Stanley, ]$ Ill.Wd #%W, #%% (#YPX).
147 Id. at #%%-%].
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with the married couple.148 However, “married fathers—whether divorced,
widowed, or separated—and mothers—even if unwed” were presumed fit
to raise their children.149
The Court invalidated the statute, holding that “[t]he private interest . . . of
a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.”150 The Court stated
that “as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on
his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him.”151 In addition,
the Court held that Illinois had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by rejecting Stanley’s attempt to gain a hearing while
also affording the opportunity to other parents at risk of losing custody of their
children.152
In Stanley, the Court effectively elevated the rights of unmarried
fathers who “sired and raised” their children to that of their parental
counterparts.153 The progeny of Stanley reified the importance of due
process in parental rights termination proceedings.154 But the Court also
proceeded to pare back any notion that it would take an expansive
approach to the principles elucidated in Stanley. That process began six
years later, when the Court unanimously denied an unwed father’s attempt
to block his child’s adoption by the husband of the woman with whom he
conceived the child.155
Leon Webster Quilloin had never married or lived with the mother of
his son, but he occasionally visited and gave his child gifts.156 Still, he
148
149
150
151
152
153

Stanley, ]X$ U.S. at O]O.
Id. at O]P.
Id. at O$#.
Id. at O]Y.
Id.
Id. at O$X; Meyer, supra note #]W, at #W_ (interpreting Stanley as holding “that at least
some unmarried fathers have constitutionally protected interests in relationships with their
children”).
154 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_, WO# (#Y_%) (“When an unwed father
demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by [coming] forward to
participate in the rearing of his child . . . his interest in personal contact with his child acquires
substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn’t Want to be Daddy Anymore: An
Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, #O YALE J. L. & FEMINISM #Y%, WXP (WXX]) (noting
that the Court’s “biology plus” test “recognize[s] that biological fathers who have actively
asserted their parental rights must receive notice of the child’s mother’s intent to have the child
adopted”). While the question of whether American Indians were entitled to due process was
settled by this time following Congress’s grant of citizenship to Indians, see supra note #W, that
question had “remained unanswered through most of the nineteenth century.” Cleveland, supra
note %X, at WP.
155 Quilloin v. Walcott, ]%] U.S. W]O, W$O (#YP_).
156 Id. at W$#.
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had “never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and, according
to the Court’s characterization, “never shouldered any significant
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection,
or care of the child.”157 Nearly three years after his son’s birth, his mother
married Randall Walcott.158 Eight years later, Walcott filed a petition for
adoption.159 Quilloin sought to block the adoption of his son and secure
visitation rights. He did not, however, attempt to gain custody. The
Georgia law at issue only required the consent of biological mothers for
the adoption of children born to unwed parents, but it required the consent
of both parents in all other situations.160 To thwart the adoption, Quilloin
sought to legitimize his child, but his petition was denied.161 Invoking
Stanley, he challenged the law on due process and equal protection
grounds, claiming that he deserved the same right to withhold his consent
to adoption as other fathers.
The Court rejected his claims and held “that the State could permissibly
give [Quilloin] less veto authority than it provides to a married father.”162
But it couched that conclusion in the belief that a married father—even one
whose marriage has dissolved—“will have borne full responsibility for the
rearing of his children during the period of the marriage.”163 Quilloin, on the
other hand, never “had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his child.”164
Accordingly, he had not been denied due process or equal protection under
the Constitution.
The Court cast the case as one in which it was merely affirming the
existence of an intact family—composed of the child, his natural mother, and
his stepfather—not rejecting the formation of a new family, composed of
Quilloin and his son.165 In deciding Quilloin, the Court reserved the question
of whether Georgia’s statute impermissibly distinguished among unmarried

157
158
159
160
161

Id. at W$O.
Id. at W]P.
Id. at W]Y.
Id. at W]_.
Id. at W$%. There was evidence that Quilloin was unaware of the process for legally
legitimizing his child until after Walcott filed the adoption petition. Id. at W$].
162 Id. at W$O.
163 Id.
164 Id. at W$$.
165 See id. (“[T]he result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit
already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except [Quilloin].”). At least one commentator
has interpreted the Court’s opinion to stand for the proposition that “an unwed father may have less
protection when the biological mother is part of the family unit adopting the child.” Susan Swingle,
Comment, Rights of Unwed Fathers and the Best Interests of the Child: Can These Competing
Interests Be Harmonized? Illinois’ Putative Father Registry Provides an Answer, WO LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. PX%, P#]-#$ (#YY$).
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parents by their gender.166 The Court effectively resolved that question in
Caban v. Mohammed. In Caban, the Court struck down a New York statute
that allowed an unmarried mother, but not an unmarried father, to contest
adoption of their child.167
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived with each other for five
years, during which they had two children and told others that they were
married.168 Mohammed eventually left Caban, took their two children with
her, and married another man.169 However, Caban continued to see his
children regularly during weekly visits at their grandmother’s apartment
on the floor above where he lived.170 Their grandmother eventually
returned to her native Puerto Rico, taking her two grandchildren with
her.171 During a visit to Puerto Rico, Caban picked up the children and
returned with them to New York.172 Mohammed then filed a custody
petition in New York Family Court, which granted Mohammed and her
husband temporary custody and allowed Caban and his new wife to have
visitation rights.173 The Mohammeds then filed for adoption of the
children. The Cabans responded with their own adoption filing.174 The
Court allowed the Mohammeds to adopt the children, divesting Caban of
his parental rights in the process.175 Caban was unable to adopt because
Maria, the biological mother, withheld her consent.176
In invalidating the statute, the Court noted that Caban’s “parental
relationship is substantial.”177 It reasoned that New York’s law violated the
Constitution because it “discriminate[d] against unwed fathers even when
their identity is known and they have manifested a significant paternal
interest in the child.”178 In particular, the law impermissibly presumed that
unwed fathers lacked the parental capacity of mothers.179
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167
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Caban v. Mohammed, ]]# U.S. %_X, %_Y n.P (#YPY).
Id. at %_W.
Id. At the time, Caban was still married to a previous wife. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at %_%.
Id.
Id.
Id. at %_%-_].
Id. at %_].
Id. at %_P.
Id. at %Y]. This caveat left the Court’s ruling in Quilloin undisturbed. See supra
text accompanying note #O%.
179 See id. (“The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of classifying unwed fathers
as being invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned
judgment as to the fate of their children.”).
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But four years later, the Court rejected an unwed father’s attempt to
intervene in his daughter’s adoption and began again to chip away at a liberal
reading of its earlier unwed father cases.180 That father, Jonathan Lehr, had
“never supported and rarely seen” his biological daughter, Jessica.181
Jessica’s mother, Lorraine Robertson, married another man shortly after
Jessica’s birth.182 The Robertsons filed for adoption when Jessica was two
years old.183 The adoption was granted, but Lehr claimed it was invalid
because he was never given notice of the adoption proceedings.184 He only
learned of the pending adoption petition after filing for a determination of
paternity and visitation rights.185 The adoption was granted before his
paternity determination and visitation requests, which would ultimately be
denied, were decided,186 and Lehr challenged the adoption on due process
grounds.187
The New York law at issue, its putative father registry law, only
allowed for notice of an adoption proceeding to unwed fathers when
they registered their claim of paternity with the state.188 As the Court
framed it, fathers in Lehr’s position had “the opportunity to receive
notice simply by mailing a postcard to the putative father registry.”189
But Lehr claimed that “he had a constitutional right to prior notice and
an opportunity to be heard” before his daughter’s adoption, and that the
statute’s gender classification ran afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause.190
The Court rejected Lehr’s arguments and held that the State had
“adequately protected” his “inchoate interest in establishing a relationship
with Jessica.”191 The Court’s understanding of Lerhr’s interest as
“inchoate” was key to its analysis. The Court reasoned that “the rights of
. . . parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed,”
insinuating that paternal rights only stem from paternal actions.192 The
180
181
182

Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_ (#Y_%).
Id. at W]Y-$X.
Id. at W$X. Importantly, “[t]he dispute did not concern the qualifications of Mr.
Robertson as Jessica’s adoptive father.” Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of
Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, ]$ OHIO ST. L.J. %#%, %#] (#Y_]).
183 Lehr, ]O% U.S. at W$X.
184 Id.
185 Id. at W$%.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at W$X-$#.
189 Id. at WOW n.#_.
190 Id. at W$$. Lehr was never “shown to be unqualified to exercise parental
responsibilities and rights.” Buchanan, supra note #_W, at %#].
191 Lehr, ]O% U.S. at WO$.
192 Id. at W$P.

#$]X

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. #OP: #$#%

Court homed in on what it perceived as a paucity of paternal actions on
Lehr’s part, noting that he had never lived with Jessica or Lorraine, never
assisted them financially, and never offered to marry Lorraine.193
Accordingly, his relationship did not acquire the “substantial protection
under the Due Process Clause” which “an unwed father [who] demonstrates
a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood” earns.194 The Court
reiterated that constitutional protection could not be earned by “the mere
existence of a biological link,”195 but conceded that its earlier unwed father
cases did not allow for the application of laws like New York’s where “the
mother and father are in fact similarly situated.”196
When the Court next considered the case of an unwed father, its task
was not nearly as simple. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court rejected
the due process claims of an unwed man seeking to establish his paternity
of a child he claimed to have conceived with a married woman.197 Under
the relevant California law, children born to married women living with
their husbands were presumed to be the biological—and, for all intents,
legal—products of that union.198 Only the husband or wife could rebut that
presumption under the state law.199 A four-justice plurality of the Court
rested its decision on “the absence of any constitutionally protected right
to legal parentage on the part of . . . adulterous natural father[s],” and
rejected the due process challenge of Michael, the putative natural
father.200
Michael had had an affair with his neighbor, Carole, who was married
to Gerald.201 Carole gave birth to a daughter, Victoria, and confided in
Michael that he may be Victoria’s biological father.202 Throughout the
first three years of her life, Victoria lived with Carole.203 After that time,
Carole had blood tests taken that demonstrated a Y_.XP% probability that
Michael was Victoria’s biological father.204 Months later, Carole and
Victoria visited Michael in St. Thomas, where “Michael held Victoria out
as his child.”205 After two months, Carole left with Victoria, started living
193
194
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Id. at W$W.
Id. at WO#.
Id.
Id. at WOP.
]Y# U.S. ##X, ### (#Y_Y) (plurality opinion).
Id. at ##$.
Id.
Id. at #WY n.P.
Id. at ##%.
Id. at ##].
Id.
Id.
Id.
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with another man in California,206 and began rebuffing Michael’s attempts
to visit Victoria.207 Michael subsequently filed an action to establish his
paternity of Victoria and gain visitation rights, but Carole and Michael
then reconciled before the suit was ultimately decided.208 Michael then
lived with Carole and Victoria for an eight-month stretch, except for when
he was abroad for business.209 During that time, Carole and Michael
signed a stipulation agreeing that Michael was Victoria’s natural father.210
Carole later left Michael, rejoined Gerald, to whom she was still married,
and instructed her lawyers not to file the stipulation.211 By the time the
Supreme Court decided the case five years later, Carole, Gerald, and
Victoria were living together.212
California’s law was based on an intent to protect the integrity of a
marital relationship.213 Michael asserted a violation of his substantive due
process rights because that interest, in his view, was inadequate to
terminate the parent-child relationship that he had formed with Victoria.214
As the plurality noted, that argument was “predicated on the assertion that
Michael ha[d] a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his
relationship with Victoria.”215 But the plurality viewed Stanley, Quilloin,
Caban, and Lehr as resting on “the historic respect . . . traditionally
accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family.”216
Accordingly, the plurality limited its inquiry to whether individuals
similarly situated to Michael and Victoria had historically “been treated as
a protected family unit.”217 The plurality ruled that they had not, and noted
that, in fact, the marital unit—here comprised of Gerald, Carole, and
Victoria—was actually the unit that had been traditionally protected.218 As
206
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ##]-#$.
Id. at ##$.
Id.
Id. at #%#.
Id. at #W#.
Id.
Id. at #W% (emphasis added).
Id. at #W].
Id. In this sense, the Court heavily relied on the marital presumption. See supra notes #%Y–
#]W and accompanying text. The theories underlying the married and unmarried biological father
distinction made in ICWA and the similar distinctions made in the Court’s biology plus cases may
stem from the same reasoning. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About
Parenthood, ]X UCLA L. REV. O%P, O]_ (#YY%) (explaining that the premises underlying paternal
rights in situations where a biological father is married to his child’s biological mother and where
an unmarried biological father has an established relationship with his biological child are both
dependent on an understanding of paternity as “a cultural creation—and a choice—not the
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such, the plurality held that it was not unconstitutional for a state to give
preference to a husband over a putative biological father in establishing
paternity.219
The plurality’s reasoning did not command a majority of the Court.
Justice Stevens, writing separately and concurring in the judgment,
rejected the plurality’s contention that a parent–child relationship of a
constitutionally protectable nature could never develop between an unwed
father with a child born to a married mother.220 Justice Stevens’s
concurrence relied on the narrower contention that the California statute’s
allowance of a court, in its discretion, to grant visitation rights to any
person with an interest in a child’s welfare effectively protected Michael’s
due process rights because the California courts undertook that analysis.221
The concurrence left the Court’s biology plus jurisprudence intact, but
with no clearly discernable formulation of its continued utility beyond the
precise contours of the facts adduced in the cases the Court had already
decided.
The erratic nature of the biology plus case law reflects what the Court
has characterized as the “lurking problems” inherent in cases concerning
“proof of paternity.”222 But despite the relatively concentrated period in
which the Court expanded, reified, and curtailed the custodial rights of
unwed fathers, the Court’s biology plus cases fit a broader pattern of the
Court inscribing the parameters of parental rights. Nearly half a century
before Stanley, the Court recognized an individual right to “establish a
home and bring up children” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

automatic correlate of a biological tie” (footnote omitted)) [hereinafter Dolgin, Just a Gene]; David
D. Meyers, The Constitutionality of Best Interests Parentage, #] WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. _$P,
_OX (WXXO) (noting that the marital presumption of parenthood at common law “protected social
parentage over biological parentage”). However, in a modern context, where fluid family structures
may allow for shifting notions of involvement, such a choice is complicated. See Janet L. Dolgin,
The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, #XW COLUM. L. REV. %%P, %$X (WXXW)
(“There is widespread confusion about families in general and especially about children and the
implications for children of the ‘modern’ conception of adults within families as autonomous
individuals, connected only insofar as, and for as long as, they choose to be connected.”)
[hereinafter Dolgin, Family Arbiter].
219 Michael H., ]Y# U.S. at #WY.
220 Id. at #%% (Stevens, J., concurring). Four other justices also rejected this proposition.
Id. at #%O (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221 Id. at #%] (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a
Mother, #% WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. ]WY, ]]Y (WXXP) (“Justice Stevens’s rationale left
Michael with the right to petition for visitation, regardless of whether he could be declared ‘the
father.’”). The Court later held the application of a similar law unconstitutional in Troxel v.
Granville. $%X U.S. $P, P% (WXXX). In Troxel, grandparents sought to establish visitation rights
with their grandchild, whose father—their son—had died. Id. at OX. Justice Stevens dissented.
222 Gomez v. Perez, ]XY U.S. $%$, $%_ (#YP%) (per curiam).
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Process Clause.223 Just a few years later, it clarified that that right
encompassed “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control.”224 This right existed
primarily in parents, with states only permitted a subsidiary interest in the
“custody, care and nurture” of children.225
The process of acknowledging parental rights continued in tandem
with Stanley and its progeny, but it increasingly imparted a view of
parenthood unmoored from biology. The Court acknowledged that “the
usual understanding of ‘family’ implies biological relationships,” but
reasoned that “biological relationships are not exclusive determination of
the existence of a family.”226 In accordance with that view, its biology
plus case law increasingly shuttered the parental rights of biological
fathers unable to demonstrate their participation in a family unit bound
by more than genetic ties. Central to these cases was the Court’s
conclusion that actions, and not mere biology, were necessary for unwed
fathers to have their paternal rights afforded constitutional protection.227
In Stanley, the Court saw a man who had acted as a primary caregiver and
was wrongly divested of his parental rights.228 In Quilloin, the Court saw
the opposite. But in both cases, the Court applied subjective standards to
facts, etching a fact-centric notion of protectable paternal interests in the
process.
Those interests were forged in the context of a broader reorientation of
gender roles in the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court had long cast women
in a singularly domestic sphere, portraying them as “the center of home
and family life”229 even in the midst of “vast changes in the[ir] social and
legal position[s].”230 The biology plus cases were primary disrupting
forces in that myopic narrative, giving legal credence to the employ of men
223
224
225
226
227

Meyer v. Nebraska, WOW U.S. %YX, %YY (#YW%).
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of Holy Names, WO_ U.S. $#X, $%]-%$ (#YW$).
Prince v. Massachusetts, %W# U.S. #$_, #OO (#Y]]).
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, ]%# U.S. _#O, _]% (#YPP).
See Dolgin, Just a Gene, supra note W#_, at O$X (“The Court’s decision in Stanley
strongly suggests that the rights extended to Stanley depended on his position as a biological
and a social father to his children.”); Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the
Family, ##Y YALE L.J. #W%O, #W$% (WX#X) (“Stanley acted like a father, but perhaps more
importantly, he acted like a husband, performing his parental role in a manner consistent with
marital family norms.”); Woodhouse, supra note #, at #PYO (“In the wake of Stanley, and the line
of cases it inaugurated, the conduct of genetic or biological fathers has become a threshold
adoption issue.”).
228 The dissent, however, characterized Stanley as “concerned with the loss of the welfare
payments he would suffer as a result of the designation of others as guardians of [his] children.”
Stanley v. Illinois, ]X$ U.S. O]$, OOP (#YPW) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
229 Hoyt v. Florida, %O_ U.S. $P, OW (#YO#).
230 Goesaert v. Cleary, %%$ U.S. ]O], ]O$-OO (#Y]_).
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in traditionally maternal caregiving roles. But the Court’s commitment to
shedding the gendered trapping of tradition has wavered at times as its
opinions have embraced gender roles to sanction differences in the
unequal burdens placed on the assumption of parental rights by men and
women.231 And even where the caregiving role of fathers is clear, the Court
has impeded their assertions of parental rights.232 To the extent that
Adoptive Couple fits within the Court’s biology plus jurisprudence, it too
may stand for a strained view of what the proper course for asserting
paternal rights entails.
IV. CONSIDERING STATE LAW INCORPORATION:
A THRESHOLD ISSUE
ICWA is mired and buoyed by its interpretations, with expansive
readings of its provisions giving weight to Congress’s protectionist
inclinations and narrow readings evincing the role that judicial discretion
still plays in cabining American Indians’ rights.233 The lack of a federal
definition for “acknowledged or established” raises the question of
whether such an issue of family law is better left for the states to determine.
This Part briefly considers states’ methods for determining paternity
before considering the implications of wholesale adoptions of those
definitions into ICWA.
A. Paternity by State
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act requires states to create and enforce
procedures for establishing paternity as a condition for receiving federal funds
for child support and welfare programs.234 Under Title IV-D, states must
231 See Nguyen v. INS, $%% U.S. $%, $O-$P, P% (WXX#) (upholding a statute that “imposes
different requirements for [a] child’s acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the
citizen parent is the mother or the father”). But see Sessions v. Morales-Santana, #Y_ L. Ed. Wd
#$X, #P]-P$ (WX#P) (distinguishing Nguyen and invalidating a physical presence requirement’s
“gender-based distinction” in a citizenship statute).
232 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, $]W U.S. #, #P-#_ (WXX]) (denying
standing to a father attempting to assert a First Amendment claim on behalf of his child
because he lacked sole legal custody).
233 See Christine D. Bakeis, The Indian Child Welfare Act of STfg: Violating Personal
Rights for the Sake of the Tribe, #X NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y $]%, $PX (#YYO)
(“[T]he language of the ICWA is anything but clear.”); Roger A. Tellinghuisen, The Indian Child
Welfare Act of STfg: A Practical Guide with [Limited] Commentary, %] S.D. L. REV. OOX, OO%
(#Y_Y) (“[I]t has become ever more apparent that the terms of the Act are unclear and invite
litigation.”).
234 ]W U.S.C. § O$](])(A) (WX#W). That same law requires states to enter “into cooperative
arrangements with . . . Indian tribes or tribal organizations” to affect the administration of child
support plans. Id. § O$](P). A separate law, The Child Support Recovery Act of #YYW, Pub. L.
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“regularly and frequently publicize . . . the availability and encourage the use
of procedures for voluntary establishment of paternity.”235 Those procedures
also include the ability to locate parents for purposes of “enforcing child
support obligations, or making or enforcing a child custody or visitation
determination.”236
Under the law, states are required to have “[e]xpedited administrative
and judicial procedures” in place to establish paternity.237 States must also
have procedures permitting a father to establish paternity of his child at
any point before the child turns eighteen.238 Title IV-D also provides, in
cases of contested paternity, for relevant parties to undergo genetic testing
unless certain conditions are not met.239 For positive results, states are
required to enact “[p]rocedures which create a rebuttable or, at the option
of the State, conclusive presumption of paternity upon genetic testing
results indicating a threshold probability that the alleged father is the father
of the child.”240 For voluntary acknowledgments, states must provide an
affidavit process and fully recognize valid affidavits signed in other
states.241 Putative fathers must be afforded “a reasonable opportunity to
initiate a paternity action.”242
This regime of biology-dependent paternity determinations and the
unfurling of states’ marital-minded parenthood orthodoxy post-Stanley has
resulted in states adopting laws far more permissive towards and protective
of paternal rights than that mandated by the Supreme Court.243 But the
prevalence of states conferring paternal rights through determinations of
“biology is in fact a far more fragile and insecure system of parental
opportunity” where biology begets the convenience of claiming paternal
rights, but does not guarantee their instantaneous acquisition.244 For many
states, that opportunity is fairly consistent with the language of ICWA.

No. #XW-$W#, #XO Stat. %]X%, provides for federal penalties in limited circumstances for the
failure to pay child support obligations.
235 ]W U.S.C. § O$](W%) (WX#W).
236 Id. § O$](_).
237 Id. § OOO(a)(W).
238 Id. § OOO(a)($)(A).
239 Id. § OOO(a)($)(B).
240 Id. § OOO(a)($)(G).
241 Id. § OOO(a)($)(C)(iv). The state agencies which maintain birth records are required to
provide voluntary paternity establishment procedures. Id. § OOO(a)($)(C)(iii)(I).
242 Id. § OOO(a)($)(L).
243 Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, #YYO UTAH L. REV.
]O#, ]O_.
244 Carbone, supra note Y, at #%WW.
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Indeed, that language is nearly identical to that of more than a dozen state
laws that addressed issues of paternity at the time of ICWA’s enactment.245
Similarly, many states now provide presumptions in favor of
biological and legal paternity in instances where an unwed putative
father, in conjunction with the child’s mother, attests to his paternity
through a formal state procedure.246 Other states forgo the formal
requirement, mandating, like ICWA, that a putative father need only
affirmatively acknowledge their paternity.247 In all, twenty-five states
permit voluntary paternal acknowledgments through paternity registries,
twenty-one allow acknowledgment through court affidavit, twenty-six
permit paternity establishment through voluntary consent to
identification on a birth certificate, and forty-one states permit courtordered genetic testing to resolve paternity claims.248
B. Rejecting Wholesale Incorporation
The perceived wisdom of state law tending to define family structure
absent extraordinary circumstances seemingly compels the incorporation
of states’ paternity laws in § #YX%(Y).249 That same wisdom has led to the
incorporation of state law definitions in federal statutes bearing on family
relations. In De Sylva v. Ballentine, the Supreme Court opted to defer to
states’ definitions of “children” for purposes of the federal Copyright Act
of #Y]P.250 The Court reasoned that “the scope of a federal right is, of
245 See Brief for Casey Family Programs et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
%W, %W n.P, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P (WX#%) (noting that at least sixteen states,
like Congress, sought to “protect the child’s ties to an acknowledged or established father”).
246 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § PWW.#XX%(#) (WX#Y) (“If a child is born out of wedlock, a man
is considered to be the natural father of that child if the man joins with the mother of the child and
acknowledges that child as his child by completing a form that is an acknowledgment of parentage.”).
247 See, e.g., State ex rel T.A.B. v. Corrigan, OXX S.W.Wd _P, _Y-YX (Mo. Ct. App. #Y_X)
(interpreting a state statute requiring that “the father of an illegitimate child . . . has
acknowledged the child as his own by affirmatively asserting his paternity” in order to invoke
a “legal relationship” with the child in court proceedings).
248 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED FATHERS % (WX#_).
249 See Elk Gove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, $]W U.S. #, #P (WXX]) (“One of the principal
areas in which this Court has customarily declined to intervene is the realm of domestic
relations.”); In re Burrus, #%O U.S. $_O, $Y%-Y] (#_YX) (“The whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the
laws of the United States.”); Albertina Antogini, From Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers
Abroad and at Home, HARV. J. L. & GENDER ]X$, ]$O (WX#%) (“The Supreme Court has little
case law addressing custody, as it is by and large a product of state law.”). But see generally Jill
Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, ]$ UCLA L. REV. #WYP (#YY_)
(characterizing the traditional notion of states having sole responsibility for the development of
family law as misplaced).
250 %$# U.S. $PX, $_X-_# (#Y$O). De Sylva has been cited approvingly by at least one state
court grappling with how to define “acknowledged or established” under § #YX%(Y). In In re
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course, a federal question, but that does not mean that its content is not to
be determined by state, rather than federal law.”251 The Court further
explained that “[t]his is especially true where a statute deals with a familial
relationship; there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is
primarily a matter of state concern.”252 The De Sylva Court’s use of state
law was characteristic of the federal courts’ approach to issues of family
law at the time.253
However, such deference undercuts the uniformity sought by ICWA254
and risks a relapse of the state court obstruction which the Act sought to
quell.255 In fact, it may add to the disunity which already exists.256 It would
also allow for the value judgments that animated Congress’s enactment of
ICWA to befall the unwed fathers who attempt to establish parenthood under
the Act.257
But beyond the policy risks which allowing for only state law
incorporation may entail, incorporation is also undercut by common
practices in statutory interpretation and the Supreme Court’s precedent in
Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, the Supreme Court of New Jersey inferred “a legislative
intent to have acknowledgment or establishment of paternity determined by state law.” $]% A.Wd
YW$, Y%$ (N.J. #Y__). The In re Adoption court reasoned that ICWA “primarily was enacted to
provide Indian parents with sufficient leverage to resist involuntary or induced voluntary
placements of their children.” Id. at Y]%. Notably, this case was decided before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield., where the Court explained
that “Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but
also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted
by non-Indians.” ]YX U.S. %X, ]Y (#Y_Y). At least one commentator has suggested that the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Holyfield “may lead to a reexamination of” In re Adoption.
Tellinghuisen, supra note W%%, at OP].
251 De Sylva, %$# U.S. at $_X.
252 Id.
253 See Dolgin, Family Arbiter, supra note W#_, at %$] (“Until the second half of the
twentieth century, the legal system relied almost exclusively on principles of state law to resolve
domestic disputes.”). Traditionally, federal courts were also barred from exercising jurisdiction
over custody disputes. Burrus, #%O U.S. at $Y] (“As to the right to the control and possession of
this child, . . . it is one in regard to which neither the Congress of the United States nor any
authority of the United States has any special jurisdiction.”).
254 W$ U.S.C. § #YXW (WX#W) (declaring that ICWA establishes “minimum Federal standards
for the removal of Indian children from their families”).
255 See supra notes P–Y and accompanying text.
256 See Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision of the
Indian Child Welfare Act, %_ SANTA CLARA L. REV. ]#Y, ]#Y (#YY_) (noting that “state courts
have continually disagreed about the Act’s requirements and when it should be applied”).
257 Some commentators have contended that ICWA’s jurisdictional scheme has already
allowed for such value judgment to befall Native Americans. See Jeanne Louise Carriere,
Representing the Native American: Culture Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, PY
IOWA L. REV. $_$, O#X (#YY]) (“In leaving questions open for Euro-American courts to answer,
Congress entrusted determinations of the substance and value of Native American family culture
to the state courts that it earlier had found to be culturally inadequate to make these
determinations.”).
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interpreting ICWA’s provisions. This is evident in the Court’s declaration
in Jerome v. United States that “in the absence of a plain indication to the
contrary,” the Court “generally assume[s] . . . that Congress when it enacts
a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state
law.”258 The Court reiterated this principle of statutory construction in
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, its first case to deal with
ICWA.259 In Holyfield, the Court considered “whether there is any reason
to believe that Congress intended the ICWA definition of ‘domicile’ to be
a matter of state law.”260 It answered in the negative. In doing so, the Court
noted that its presumption against reliance on state law by Congress is
made “in light of the object and policy of the statute” at issue.261 The Court
found the object and policy of ICWA to be at odds with a rendering of it
as “a statute under which different rules apply from time to time to the
same child, simply as a result of his or her transport from one State to
another.”262 A similar recognition of Congress’s intention to create a
“uniform federal” law should weigh in favor of eschewing strictly statelaw-based incorporation into the definition of “acknowledged or
established” under § #YX%(Y).263
As a matter of statutory construction, the absence of a reference to state
law in § #YX%(Y) is revealing. The Act often explicitly refers to state law for
purposes of delineating where its application is intended. For example, §
#Y#%(b) of the Act permits parents and Indian custodians to withdraw their
“consent to a foster care placement under State law” to facilitate the return of
their children.264 No such invocation of state law is present in § #YX%(Y). In
contrast, “State law” is expressly included in the definition of “Indian
custodian,” merely three subsections before the definition of “parent.”265
An incorporation of state law in the context of § #YX%(Y) would also run
counter to clear Court precedent rejecting the application of state laws in
the context of legislation concerning Indian affairs.266 That precedent has

258
259
260
261

%#_ U.S. #X#, #X] (#Y]%).
]YX U.S. %X (#Y_Y).
Id. at ]%.
Id. at ]P (internal quotation marks omitted). Viewed in the context of the Holyfield Court’s
reasoning, the De Sylva Court’s allowance of state law to define “children” in the Copyright Act of
#Y]P is unremarkable. There, the Court noted that the “general scheme of the” Copyright Act looked
to state law for its definitions of familial relationships. De Sylva v. Ballentine, %$# U.S. $PX, $_X-_#
(#Y$O).
262 Holyfield, ]YX U.S. at ]O.
263 Id. at ]O-]P.
264 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#%(b) (WX#W).
265 Id. § #YX%(O).
266 See Rice v. Olson, %W] U.S. P_O, P_Y (#Y]$) (“The policy of leaving Indians free from
state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted the Nation’s history.”).
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repeatedly recognized the independence of tribes from state laws in
matters of “social relations”267—of which determinations of paternity
surely qualify. A contrary determination would only serve to spawn “the
vagaries of the laws of the several states”268 in place of the uniform Act.
However, this reality must necessarily be reconciled with the Supreme
Court’s repeated instruction that congressional legislation in the realm of
Indian affairs should be liberally construed in favor of the American
Indians to whom it applies.269 In that respect, state laws, as discussed
above, are often far more protective of paternal rights—and receptive to
claims of paternity—than the Court’s biology plus cases. The paternity
recognition methods currently utilized by states—including birth
certificates, paternity tests, court affidavits, and paternity registries—
also offer sensible approaches to satisfying § #YX%(Y)’s “acknowledged
or established” language. For these reasons, where enough time has
passed for a putative father to develop a constitutionally protectable
relationship with his American Indian child, but where that father has not
met state law paternity requirements consistent with § #YX%(Y)’s text and
the Act’s protectionist tilt, a state court should next consider whether the
putative father, consistent with the Court’s biology plus jurisprudence,
has developed a parent–child relationship sufficient for due process
protections to attach.270 In this sense, the constitutional law emanating
267 United States v. Kagama, ##_ U.S. %P$, %_# (#__O). Conversely, the Court has recognized
the “Federal Government’s broad authority to legislate” in the area of Indian affairs on a classwide basis. Duro v. Reina, ]Y$ U.S. OPO, OYW (#YYX).
268 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, %#_ U.S. %O%, %OP (#Y]%).
269 See, e.g., United States v. Nice, W]# U.S. $Y#, $Y_ (#Y#O) (“According to a familiar rule,
legislation affecting the Indians is to be construed in their interest and a purpose to make a radical
departure is not lightly to be inferred.”).
270 Following Adoptive Couple, at least one state court has implicitly embraced this
approach, holding that ICWA’s reasonable doubt standard for the termination of parental rights
be applied to a father of an Indian child “although he never had legal or physical custody rights
as those terms are legally employed.” In re Beers, %W$ Mich. App. O$%, OP$ (Mich. Ct. App. WX#_).
The court explained that the father in question, despite not having custody rights under state law,
lived with his child and the child’s mother “as a family unit,” id., and that the father had “an
existing relationship” with his child. Id. at OPO. The Act similarly compels the importation of
more lenient standards to some of its provisions. See W$ U.S.C. § #YW# (WX#W) (“[W]here State or
Federal law applicable to a child custody proceeding . . . provides a higher standard of protection
to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided under
this subchapter, the State or Federal court shall apply the State or Federal standard.”). With
regards to “acknowledged or established,” the incorporation of state law to define these terms
need not include generally applicable paternity determination requirements; it may instead be
state ICWA iterations intended to broaden the Act’s protections. See In re Adoption of T.A.W.,
%_% P.%d ]YW, $XP (Wash. WX#O) (noting that Washington’s state law version of ICWA provides
broader protection to parents of Indian children than the federal ICWA). Those state law ICWA
iterations may permissibly discard § #YX%(Y)’s “acknowledged or established” language entirely.
See Noah v. Kelly B., OP P.%d %$Y, %O_ (Okla. Civ. App. WXX%) (“The Oklahoma Act does not
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from the Court’s biology plus doctrine is “interstitial,”271 patching the
gaps that may exist between state law and constitutionally protected
paternal interests.272
Such applications of § #YX%(Y) must also take place with the recognition
that ICWA and the federal government’s trust responsibilities to American
Indians involve “uniquely federal interests”273 which may require the
displacement of state law. In those instances where too little time has passed
between an American Indian child’s birth and the assertion of paternity in
a child custody proceeding by the child’s unwed putative father, and where
the father is granted no paternal rights under state law, a determination of
paternity must be made independent of state law and with regard to
reasonable interpretations of “acknowledged or established.” The
specifications of that interpretation stretch beyond the scope of this
Comment, which focuses on the reach of “acknowledged or established” in
instances where putative fathers have had an opportunity to develop
meaningful relationships with their children. However, the Court’s decision
in Holyfield rejects the notion that custody itself is required for paternity to
be established or acknowledged under § #YX%(Y). In Holyfield, the Court
stated that ICWA “cannot be applied so as automatically to reward those
who obtain custody, whether lawfully or otherwise, and maintain it during
any ensuing (and protracted) litigation.”274 This suggests that the mere
denial, purposeful or otherwise, of custody to unwed fathers immediately
following their child’s birth is insufficient to bar their later assumption of
parenthood status under § #YX%(Y).

include the federal definition of ‘parent’ that excludes the unwed father where paternity has not
been established or acknowledged.”).
271 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, $] C OLUM .
L. R EV . ]_Y, ]Y_ (#Y$]).
272 The application of state law here is a prudential one that in no way defeats the purpose
of the Act. State courts have routinely held that state procedural requirements inconsistent with
the purpose and text of ICWA are displaced by the Act. See, e.g., In re A.O., _YO N.W.Wd O$W,
O$$-$O (S.D. WX#P) (holding that a trial court’s denial of a parent and tribe’s request for transfer
as untimely was improper because it failed to account for the considerations mandated by the
Act in instances of transfer); In re J.J.T., No. XY-#P-XX#OW-CV, WX#P WL O$XO]X$ (Tex. App. WX#P)
(holding that a state “procedural rule which would deny the right to intervene in a child custody
proceeding because the tribe did not file a written pleading prior to the hearing” is invalid in an
ICWA-governed proceeding). State paternity laws inconsistent with the Act’s “acknowledged or
established language” would be similarly displaced.
273 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., ]$# U.S. O%X, O]X (#Y_X).
274 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, ]YX U.S. %X, $] (#Y_Y) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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V. FASHIONING A STANDARD
This Part outlines the often nebulous standard the Supreme Court has
utilized in its biology plus cases. It begins by considering the rationale for
interpreting § #YX%(Y) through the use of a biology plus framework. It then
explores the contours of that framework, explicating its discernible principles
in the process.
A. A Constitutional Imperative
The rooting of an “acknowledged or established” definition within
the Court’s biology plus framework is supported by the legislative
history of the Act. The House Report accompanying the Act explicitly
notes that § #YX%(Y)’s definition of “parent” “is not meant to conflict with
the decision of the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois.”275 Accordingly,
Congress intended to align its definition of “parent” with the Court’s
Stanley doctrine, effectively conferring congressional sanction to impart
the biology plus notion of parenthood into the statute.276 Indeed, the
Court’s conception of a protectable relationship between an unmarried
father and his biological child is consonant with § #YX%(Y)’s
acknowledge-or-establish language. The adoption of a biology plus
framework is also supported by ICWA’s explicit mention of Congress’s
intention to create “minimum federal standards,”277 as the biology plus
standard utilized in Stanley and its progeny etches the minimum that an
unwed father must do to achieve a constitutionally protectable
relationship with his child.
In rejecting calls for it to promulgate regulations giving a specific
definition to “parent” under § #YX%(Y), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
adopted this understanding as well. It recognized that the “Supreme Court
and subsequent case law has already articulated a constitutional standard
regarding the rights of unwed fathers.”278 That standard, the constitutional
baseline by which the rights of unwed fathers gain constitutional protection,
is the minimum federal standard. In articulating that position, the BIA
275 H.R. REP. NO. Y$-#%_O, at W# (#YP_). In Stanley, the Court inextricably linked the
termination of parental rights to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
requiring states to provide hearings to determine individuals’ fitness as parents before their
parental rights can be terminated. ]X$ U.S. O]$, O]Y (#YPW); see supra notes #]%–#$] and
accompanying text.
276 Analogs in congressional awareness of judicial precedent can regularly be found
throughout federal criminal common law. See generally Frank Easterbrook, The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, ##W HARV. L. REV. #Y#% (#YYY).
277 W$ U.S.C. § #YXW (WX#W).
278 Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, _# Fed. Reg. %_,PP_, %_,POY (June #], WX#O) (to
be codified at W$ C.F.R. pt. W%).
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favorably cited the Alaska Supreme Court’s recognition that other courts
have interpreted Stanley to mean that an unmarried father who “manifests an
interest in developing a relationship with [his] child cannot constitutionally
be denied parental status based solely on the failure to comply with the
technical requirements for establishing paternity.”279 The BIA’s
understanding of the settled nature of “acknowledged or established” in
ICWA following Stanley implicitly reflects an acknowledgment of the
biology plus standard as governing their interpretation.280
That interpretation is similarly buttressed by the approach to
interpreting ICWA first utilized by the Court in Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield. In Holyfield, the Court found it “helpful
to borrow established common-law principles of domicile to the extent
that they are not inconsistent with the objectives of the congressional
scheme.”281 Here, too, the common law provides a pertinent analog in
the holding out doctrine through which social fatherhood, as
established by social conduct of a parental nature, is held to confer
parental rights.282
To comport with the requirements of the holding out doctrine—and
“hold out” a child to the world as one’s biological offspring—a man must
regularly engage in acts such as “changing the child’s diapers; feeding him;
taking him to the doctor; bathing him; . . . and providing or building a loving
relationship with [his] child.”283 The doctrine is rooted in a respect and
formal acknowledgment of the acts deemed to connote parenthood in a
279
280

Bruce L. v. W.E., W]P P.%d YOO, YP_ (Alaska WX##) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The prior year, the BIA issued interim guidelines suggesting that unwed fathers
“need only take reasonable steps to establish or acknowledge paternity” in order to satisfy
the definition of “parent” under ICWA. Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian
Child Custody Proceedings, _X Fed. Reg. #X#]O, #X#$# (Feb. W$, WX#$).
281 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, ]YX U.S. %X, ]P-]_ (#Y_Y).
282 Dowd, supra note #%_, at Y#_. Though a product of common law, the doctrine has been
embedded in state statutory law as well. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § O%-Y-%#X(A)($) (WX#Y)
(mandating paternal consent by unwed fathers for adoptions of their children “placed with the
prospective adoptive parents six months or less after the child’s birth” only when a father has
“openly lived with the child or the child’s mother for a continuous period of six months
immediately preceding the placement of the child for adoption, and the father openly held
himself out to be the father of the child during the six months period”). The holding out doctrine
has also been applied in other contexts. See, e.g., Case Note, Partnership by Estoppel Based on
a Holding Out by One Other Than the Party Sought to Be Held—Borocato v. Serio, % MD. L.
REV. #_Y (#Y%Y) (describing a court’s use of the holding out doctrine to determine that a business
relationship existed).
283 Niccol D. Kording, Little White Lies That Destroy Children’s Lives—Recreating Paternity
Fraud Laws to Protect Children’s Interests, O J.L. & FAM. STUD. W%P, W]]-]$ (WXX]). Compare
Dowd, supra note #%_, at Y#Y (criticizing the holding out doctrine as “root[ed] in patriarchal
privilege”), with Hendricks, supra note WW#, at ]%# (describing the Court’s biology plus cases, which
essentially incorporate the holding out doctrine, as “elevat[ing] the rights of men . . . by defining
parenthood in terms of motherhood and making fatherhood fit a female model”).
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private setting that, when conferred to the world, also connote it to the public
generally.284 The Court’s cases dealing with parental rights have expressed
broad support for such a rationale,285 often invoking it as a natural right.286
A federal standard for “acknowledged or established” under § #YX%(Y)
is similarly supported by practical considerations stemming from the
Court’s resolution of the issues involved in Adoptive Couple. Though the
Court did not pass upon the proper interpretation of § #YX%(Y)’s language
regarding unwed fathers, it essentially constrained any effective
constructions of “acknowledged or established”—at least for purposes of
invoking the procedural protections of § #Y#W(d) and § #Y#W(f)287—to those
consistent with biology plus case law by imposing custodial requirements
on the Act’s active efforts and parental rights termination provisions.
Accordingly, in the wake of Adoptive Couple, some courts have dispensed
with discussions of § #YX%(Y) with regard to unwed fathers, finding it
unnecessary to consider where no familial relationship exists sufficient for
a putative father to invoke § #Y#W(d) and § #Y#W(f).288
284 This aspect of the holding out doctrine is significant for its parallels to characteristics
often ascribed to nuclear families. See Ristroph & Murray, supra note WWP, at #W$O-$P (“The
marital, nuclear family is one that encourages . . . a certain kind of visibility . . . mean[ing] that
the state has encouraged the view that public recognition as a family is something to be prized.”).
285 The Court has often given the holding out doctrine an implicit sanction. In Michael H., a
plurality of the Court noted that Gerald D., whose paternity claim it gave constitutional sanction
over that of the child’s biological father, “was listed as father on the birth certificate and has always
held Victoria out to the world as his daughter.” Michael H. v. Gerald D., ]Y# U.S. ##X, ##%-#] (#Y_Y)
(plurality opinion). And in Lehr, the New York law which the Court upheld against a constitutional
challenge provided for notice of adoption proceedings to “those who live openly with the child and
the child’s mother and who hold themselves out to be the father.” Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_,
W$# (#Y_%).
286 See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, ]%# U.S. _#O, _]$
(#YPP) (“[T]he liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily
to be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Buchanan,
supra note #_W, at %W% (“That the Constitution particularly protects the custodial rights of
biological parents who perform custodial responsibilities has been stated as a fact and
explained in terms of traditional and natural right.”). Despite those notions of
superconstitutionality, the Court has repeatedly construed those rights in constitutional terms.
See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, WOW U.S. %YX, %YY (#YW%) (situating parental rights within the
liberty interests guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment). Accordingly, the analysis below
proceeds in constitutional terms.
287 In dicta, the Court strongly suggested that its statutory approach was equally
applicable to the continued custody requirements in § #Y#W(e) and § #Y#W(f). See Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P, O$W (WX#%) (“Our interpretation of § #Y#W(d) is also
confirmed by the provision’s placement next to §§ #Y#W(e) and (f) . . . . That these three
provisions appear adjacent to each other strongly suggests that . . . ‘breakup of the Indian
family’ should be read in harmony with the ‘continued custody’ requirement.”).
288 See, e.g., In re P.T.D., ]W] P.%d O#Y, OW%-W] (Mont. WX#_) (noting that § #Y#W ICWA
provisions do not apply in the case of a putative father who “has had no meaningful contact . . .
and has not established any relationship” without first considering whether he is a “parent” under
§ #YX%(Y)).
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An interpretation of § #YX%(Y) consistent with biology plus principles
is necessary lest its language become mere surplusage. The definitional
gap presented by § #YX%(Y)’s text only calls for “the normal judicial filling
of statutory interstices.”289 But that filling need not invoke the machineries
of judicial policymaking in the normal sense. The Court need only make
clear what Congress made readily apparent from ICWA’s text and
structure: the federal minimum standard of the Constitution applies.290
B. Articulating a Standard
The Court has been vague at times in describing when constitutional
protections attach to unwed fathers’ attempts to claim legal paternal
rights.291 The difficulty in culling a workable standard from the Court’s
biology plus cases is a product of the cases often representing the
extremes of exercises in paternal effort.292 Still, the standard, once
applied, is rigidly inapposite to the liminal determinations of paternity
which its opacity seems to invite.293 But despite the generalities by which
289 Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie – And of the New Federal Common Law, %Y N.Y.U.
L. REV. %_%, ]W# (#YO]).
290 This approach is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s admonishments against
placing congressional purpose above statutory text in interpreting statutes. See, e.g., Bd. of
Governors, of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., ]P] U.S. %O#, %P] (#Y_O)
(“Invocations of the ‘plain purpose’ of legislation at the expense of the terms of the statute itself
takes no account of the [legislative] process of compromise.”). Rather, the purpose—creation of
federal minimum standards—is embedded within ICWA’s text and necessarily colors its judicial
interpretation as well.
291 See Sylvain, supra note #]#, at _]X (noting that the Court did not “identify[] discernible
boundaries to the ‘substantial relationship’ test” in Caban).
292 See David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless
Father, ]# ARIZ. L. REV. P$%, PO% (#YYY) (noting that “the Court’s cases seem to contemplate
only two models of fatherhood: the man of virtue who is integrally involved in the rearing of his
children and the scofflaw who has slept on his rights while others changed diapers and read
bedtime stories”).
293 See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
Caregiving and Caregivers, Y] VA. L. REV. %_$, %Y_-YY (WXX_) (“The law effectively has
constructed a parent/stranger dichotomy in which one is either a parent, vested with the rights
and responsibilities of caregiving, or one is a legal stranger without legal entitlements or
obligations.”); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Has Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, P_ GEO.
L.J. ]$Y, ]P# (#YYX) (“Customarily, legal parenthood is an all-or-nothing status. A parent has all
of the obligation of parenthood and all of the rights; a nonparent has none of the obligations
and none of the rights.”). At one point there was the possibility that a case such as Michael H.,
where Justice Stevens’s decisive fifth vote “left Michael with the right to petition for visitation,
regardless of whether he could be declared ‘the father’”, Hendricks, supra note WW#, at ]]Y,
would broker a middle ground. But since deciding Michael H., the Court has struck down one
statute which, similar to the California visitation law applicable to Michael, provided for
visitation rights to a nonparent. Troxel v. Granville, $%X U.S. $P (WXXX). This has cast doubt on
the continued validity of a more moderate approach. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding
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the Court has dictated unwed biological fathers’ rights, some discernible
elements of their protected paternal interests have been elucidated.
The Court’s conception of paternal—and parental—rights is one
presaged on preexisting parent–child relationships both within the context
of ICWA, as evinced by Adoptive Couple, and its general biology plus
jurisprudence. The cases so far reveal that “the mere existence of a
biological link does not merit . . . constitutional protection.”294 Similarly,
“[r]andom gifts and visits by [a] biological parent are not sufficient to
establish a familial relationship.”295 But unwed fathers’ “fundamental
liberty interest . . . in the care, custody, and management of their
child[ren]” is not felled by their mere failure as “model parents” or even
the temporary lapse of custodial rights.296 Rather, it fails when there is no
relationship to dissolve.
However, in the context of ICWA, a “familial relationship” standard
which solely adheres to the markers of family development present in
traditional, nuclear families297 is inadequate and contrary to congressional
intention.298 Instead, the standard must adapt to the cultural norms which
ICWA was intended to protect, recognizing that the Court’s biology plus
framework was not fashioned in the ICWA context. But the Court’s family
jurisprudence is not anathema to “a larger conception of the family.”299 If
Principles for Picking Parents, PW HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. %W%, %WP (WXX]) (“Troxel makes it clear
that ‘parents’ are constitutionally protected against inappropriate intervention in their families
by nonparents, but it does nothing to limit how states may define parents and thus little to limit
developments of the functional parent trend.”). The functional parenthood idea referenced by
Bartholet “emphasiz[es] the daily, routine, and even mundane aspects of everyday parenting.”
Jacobs, supra note #$], at #YP; see also AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § W.X% (WXXX) (encouraging a view of functional
parenthood). But see Michael R. Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, American Law Institute’s
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding Principles
or Obligatory Footnote?, ]W FAM. L.Q. $P% (WXX_) (questioning the relevance of the ALI’s
recommendations).
294 Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_, WO# (#Y_%).; Daniel V. Zinman, Note, Father Knows Best:
The Unwed Father’s Right to Raise His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, OX FORDHAM L. REV.
YP#, YP#-PW (#YYW) (interpreting the Court’s unwed father cases to stand for the proposition that “a
natural father’s right to veto the adoption of his child does not derive from a biological link alone:
it must be accompanied by an existing parental relationship with his child”).
295 Dallas, supra note #%Y, at %P%.
296 Santosky v. Kramer, ]$$ U.S. P]$, P$% (#Y_W).
297 See Dolgin, Family Arbiter, supra note W#_, at %]W (describing the “nuclear family” as
“composed of a working husband-father, a stay-at-home wife-mother, and their children”).
298 However, “preferences for nuclear families alone does not explain the unwed father
cases” and is therefore unnecessary to consider in fashioning a biology plus test under § #YX%(Y).
Hendricks, supra note WW#, at ]]$; id. at ]]_ (“The Court’s emphasis on cohabitation between
father and child seems driven more by its interest in daily caretaking than by loyalty to the nuclear
family.”).
299 Moore v. E. Cleveland, ]%# U.S. ]Y], $X$ (#YPP) (plurality opinion).

#$$O

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. #OP: #$#%

anything, it embraces it.300 Its recognition of the nature and importance of
acknowledging protections which should be afforded to extended families
may serve as a helpful guide for courts grappling with how to weigh the
contributions of unwed fathers which will be sufficient to establish a
parental right cognizable under the Constitution, and ICWA as a result.
It has been suggested that “familial acts”—“prototypically” those
that resemble “the development of a spousal or spouse-like relationship
between a father and his child’s mother”—are the only type that pass
muster under the Court’s unwed father precedent.301 However, such a
construction of the biology plus standard in the context of ICWA would
conflict with Congress’s recognition of American Indians engaged in “a
cultural tradition in which networked caregiving, rather than
autonomous parental caregiving is the norm.”302
The Court’s biology plus precedent has also been understood to
“suggest[] that the most important factor in determining whether a
genetic father will be entitled to constitutional protection of his parental
rights is his relationship with the mother.”303 The application of a
standard permitting a court to weigh a mother’s opinion in a
determination of a putative father’s parental rights brings with it a host
of concerns about the ability of unwed fathers to develop the
“substantial relationship” which the Court’s jurisprudence gives
constitutional protection.304 In Lehr, the Court did not acknowledge the
parental rights of a father who had been deceived as to his biological
child’s whereabouts by her birth mother.305 Justice Breyer’s concurrence

300 See id. at $X$ n.#$ (acknowledging that the Court has previously vested constitutional
protection in the caregiving rights of an aunt in the absence of the “natural parents”).
301 Dolgin, Just a Gene, supra note W#_, at OPW.
302 Melissa Murray, Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving
and Caregivers, Y] VA. L. REV. %_$, ]WW (WXX_); see also Graham, supra note %], at $ (“For
many Native American nations, ‘family’ denotes extensive kinship networks that reach far
beyond the Western nuclear family.”); McCartney, supra note ]_, at $]O (“In the American
Indian culture, the rights of the extended family in its children are just as real and important as
parental rights.”); Woodward, supra note $X, at %_-%Y (#YP$) (“In the extended family, the childrearing functions are typically distributed beyond the sphere of the non-Indian family nucleus
(mother, father, and siblings) so that grandparents, uncles, aunts, and other relatives and even
friends within the tribal community often share the responsibilities and joys of bringing up the
children.”).
303 Katherine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology?: The History and Future of Paternity Law
and Parental Status, #] CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y #, %] (WXX]).
304 See Woodhouse, supra note #, at #PYP n.WW# (“[M]others have the power, in practice, to
prevent fathers from receiving notice by refusing to disclose their identity, and the power to
prevent them from actually developing a relationship by preventing contact.”).
305 Lehr v. Robertson, ]O] U.S. W]_, WOW (White, J., dissenting). But see id. at WO$ n.W%
(majority opinion) (rejecting the dissent’s characterization and noting that “[t]here is no
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in Adoptive Couple, in which he emphasized that the case did not
“involve special circumstances such as a father who was deceived about
the existence of the child or a father who was prevented from supporting
his child,” casts significant doubt on whether the Court would so readily
accept such an outcome in the context of ICWA.306
But interpretations of the Court’s biology plus jurisprudence which cast
the Court as consigning the rights of unwed fathers to the judgments of their
children’s mothers reflect a misunderstanding of the Court’s consideration
of biological mothers’ perceptions in determining the parental rights of
biological fathers.307 In Stanley, the Court’s seminal biology plus case, the
Court did not endeavor to take into account the views of the mother of Peter
Stanley’s children when determining his constitutionally protected parental
rights, as she was deceased. Rather, the Court looked to the role which he
played in his children’s lives. As the Court took great pains to explain, his
role was that of a primary caregiver, akin to a single mother. Accordingly,
“stereotypical maternal” acts of child rearing, and “not merely begetting,”
are those that render an unwed father’s actions sufficient to pass the Court’s
biology plus test.308
That test has often taken the form of a traditional “best interest”
analysis.309 Long a standard in family law proceedings involving issues
suggestion in the record that appellee engaged in fraudulent practices that led appellant not to
protect his rights”).
306 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P, OOP (WX#%) (Breyer, J., concurring); see
also Dale, supra note O, at %O# n.W_ (“The Supreme Court cases have not definitively answered
the question of what happens constitutionally in the context of a putative father who is unable
to develop a relationship with a natural child through no fault of his own.”). At least one state
court has held that Adoptive Couple is inapplicable when a birth father has been deceived by his
biological child’s biological mother about the birth and whereabouts of the child. See E.T. v.
R.K.B. (In re B.B.), ]#P P.%d #, %W n.%] (Utah WX#P) (describing Adoptive Couple as “no
controlling precedent on the precise issue before this court”). This is consistent with similar state
court rulings prior to Adoptive Couple. See, e.g., Noah v. Kelly B., OP P.%d %$Y, %OO n.## (Okla.
Civ. App. WXX%) (“[A] father may assert paternity, and all rights associated therewith, when the
true facts have been withheld from him.”). Notably, the Court in Adoptive Couple did not confine
its reading of § #Y#W(f)’s safeguards for parental rights termination decisions to apply only where
a parent had physical custody of their child. See Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O$X (“Biological
Father should not have been able to invoke § #Y#W(f) in this case, because he had never had legal
or physical custody of Baby Girl as of the time of the adoption proceedings.”). Accordingly,
though physical custody of the child may be sufficient for purposes of demonstrating the paternal
actions sufficient to establish that an unwed father is a “parent” under § #YX%(Y), it is not
necessary to invoke ICWA’s substantive protections for the termination of parental rights where
legal custody, pursuant to state law, exists.
307 See Hendricks, supra note WW#, at ]]P (“As a matter of doctrine, the Court did not hold
that unwed fathers were protected when and because they were similar to married fathers; they
were protected when and because they were similar to biological mothers.”).
308 Id.
309 The best interest test has been described as follows:
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of custody and child welfare, the best interest standard “illustrates the
ability of nineteenth- and twentieth-century family law to solidify, though
generally not to design, social mores.”310 In Quilloin, the Court utilized
the standard and “considered the effect of a continued relationship on the
child above the interest of the unwed father.”311
But the best interest standard embedded in ICWA is akin to earlier
articulations of family law in which parental rights were fundamental.312
The “best interests of Indian Children” proposition set forth in ICWA is
one consonant with “the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families.”313 The typical best interest analysis incorporates no such
consideration of broader societal interests.314 However, ICWA “is based
on the fundamental assumption that it is in the Indian child’s best interest
that its relationship to the tribe be protected.”315 Accordingly, any
application of the biology plus standard in the context of ICWA must
adhere to the best interest principles inherent in ICWA, not those
seemingly followed by the Court in its unwed father cases.316

First, it seeks to avoid the placement of a child with an individual who is unfit.
Second, it seeks to choose among otherwise fit individuals. It applies essentially
middle class values to determine what setting will serve to protect the child from
physical and emotional injury on the one hand and to a [sic] better the child
physically, emotionally, and educationally on the other. While racial, ethnic, and
religious factors may play a role in determining placements, they are secondary in
importance. Finally, the best interest test, in its modern formulation, relies on a
number of psychological factors such as the concept of the psychological parent
....
Dale, supra note O, at %OP-O_ (footnotes omitted). The “psychological parent is not
necessarily a biological parent, but is the person to whom the child feels an emotional
attachment.” Carriere, supra note W$P, at O#_. This standard is in line with “[m]odern family law
[which] proceeds from the dismantling of the system designed to insure that children would be
raised by their genetic parents.” June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the
Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Uncertainty, ## WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. #X##,
#XWX (WXX%).
310 Dolgin, Family Arbiter, supra note W#_, at %$O.
311 Sylvain, supra note #]#, at _]# n.YW.
312 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, %W# U.S #$_, #OO (#Y]]) (“It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”).
313 W$ U.S.C. § #YXW (WX#W).
314 See Bo Eskay, Review, H.B. cSlg—Codifying a Shift in Social Values Toward
Transracial Adoption, W_ ARIZ. ST. L.J. P##, P%W (#YYO) (“Cultural extinction may represent the
one circumstance in which value preferences distinct from a particular child’s interests are
weighty enough to override the best interest standard.”).
315 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, ]YX U.S. %X, $X n.W] (#Y_Y).
316 This break with the traditional best interests standards is consistent with a growing body
of commentary which has developed in critique of the best interests standard in recent years. See
generally Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child
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In those cases, the Supreme Court has never explicitly identified the
point at which a biological father’s due process rights can no longer be
invoked to establish legal paternity.317 However, the Court’s decision in Lehr
demonstrates that no constitutionally protectable right attaches to an unwed
father–child relationship where the unwed father is contesting the paternity
claim of another, does not seek to formally establish that relationship until
two years after the child’s birth, and has not previously developed a
substantial relationship with his child.318 Still, a degree a flexibility is
essential because “[t]he precise parameters of the relationship between a
biological father and a child vary with each case, and circumstantial
differences necessarily affect the case’s outcome.”319 Accordingly, the
ability of an unwed father of an Indian child to satisfy the minimum
constitutionally sufficient standards of parenthood and of § #YX%(Y), hinges
on his ability to “grasp[]” the “opportunity” for childrearing which he gains
by way of his biological connection to his child and “accept[] some measure
of responsibility for the child’s future.”320 The degree to which a putative
father of an Indian child has grasped that opportunity must ultimately be an
individualized inquiry grounded in the constitutional principles of the
unwed father cases and the goals of the Act.321

Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year Experience with the Primary
Caretaker Preference, P$ MINN. L. REV. ]WP, ]YY-$XX (#YYX).
317 In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, however, the Court
did give constitutional sanction to the State of New York’s decision that eighteen months was
the point at which “foster care begins to turn into a more permanent and family-like setting
requiring procedural protection.” ]%# U.S. _#O, _$]-$$ (#YPP).
318 See supra notes #_X–#YO and accompanying text; see also Meyer, supra note #]W, at #WY
(“[T]he ability of unwed fathers to establish their paternity today often depends upon whether
they took prompt action to assume legal responsibility for their children or instead dawdled
while others changed diapers and bought formula.”).
319 Sylvain, supra note #]#, at _%_.
320 Lehr v. Robertson, ]O% U.S. W]_, WOW (#Y_%).
321 Notably absent from this construction of a workable constitutional standard in which
to situate unwed fathers’ acknowledgment or establishment of their paternity is a focus on their
children’s views and perspectives. In many ways, such a glaring omission models the preIndustrial Age era, where the “interests of children were not relevant to determinations of
custody and parentage.” JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND
REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE W#P (#YYP). Modern family law similarly “defines
parenthood from a curiously adult-centric perspective that gives little currency to the ability of
children to recognize and claim their mothers and fathers.” Woodhouse, supra note #, at #PY$;
see also Quilloin v. Walcott, ]%] U.S. W]O, W$# n.## (#YP_) (noting that the child whose adoption
was at issue had “expressed a desire to be adopted by” the appellee and continue to visit with
the appellant, but not overtly weighing that factor in its disposition of the case). It is worth
considering whether the beliefs of a child should factor into paternity decisions under § #YX%(Y).
Indeed, some may contend that such a consideration should be part of any best interest test.
This Comment does not endeavor to take up that task or to alter the Court’s biology plus
framework from its parent-centric perspective. Rather, it installs that framework, as is, into
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C. The Potential of a Biology Plus § STUV(T)
In Adoptive Couple, the Court effectively reinforced the Lehr majority’s
admonition that “the rights of parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities
they have assumed.”322 But it did so in a way that drastically limited the
scope of unwed fathers of Indian children’s ability to assume those
responsibilities, all but ensuring that their untimely invocations of ICWA—
the Court’s so-called “ICWA trump card”323—prove fatal in the absence of
extant socially or legally paternal ties. Adoptive Couple then, like its biology
plus forebearers,324 stands for the proposition that the mere capacity for the
production of a paternal relationship between a child and his biological
father is insufficient for ICWA’s benefits to attach to the claim of an unwed
father.
The application of the biology plus standard to “acknowledged or
established” would not alter the outcome of Adoptive Couple, where the
Court assumed arguendo that Biological Father was a parent for purposes
of the Act. The Court’s determination that Adoptive Couple were “the only
parents [Baby Girl] had ever known” was central to its holding and
effectively foreclosed Biological Father from asserting a superior paternal
right despite his biological ties.325 Even with a more lenient definition of
“parent,” following Adoptive Couple an unwed father would need to
demonstrate the “continued custody” which the Court viewed as necessary
to invoke § #Y#W(f)326 and prove that “the breakup of the Indian family”
would occur to assert the “active efforts” requirement under § #Y#W(d).327
But defining “acknowledged or established” remains essential beyond
the particular provisions considered by the Court in Adoptive Couple. An
unwed putative father’s status as a “parent” under the Act is salient for

ICWA. The Act does, however, permit the consideration of the Indian child’s preferences in
adoptive, foster care, and preadoptive placements. W$ U.S.C. § #Y#$(c) (WX#W).
322 Lehr, ]O% U.S. at W$P.
323 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, $PX U.S. O%P, O$O (WX#%). Concerns that requests for
compliance with ICWA by putative fathers are used to unnecessarily delay child custody
proceedings have also been evinced by state courts. See, e.g., In re R.E.K.F., OY_ N.W.Wd #]P,
#$# (Iowa WXX$) (“[W]e share the State’s concern that a party might wrongly attempt to use the
tribal notice provisions of the Iowa ICWA as a delay tactic . . . .”). Despite these concerns, the
Act itself provides for the delay of state court child custody proceedings upon the involvement
of a parent, Indian custodian, or tribe of the Indian child. W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(a) (WX#W).
324 See Dallas, supra note #]X, at %_] n.Y% (“Where the putative father has not first
developed a relationship with the child, current Supreme Court doctrine gives him no right to
claim access to her; potential relationships between biological parents and children are not
protected.”).
325 Adoptive Couple, $PX U.S. at O]#.
326 W$ U.S.C. § #Y#W(f) (WX#W).
327 Id. § #Y#W(d).
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notification of involuntary state court proceedings,328 appointment of
counsel,329 the validation of consent to foster care placement,330 the
withdrawal of consent during adoption proceedings,331 the potential
consideration of preferences in adoptive, preadoptive, and foster care
placement,332 the return of a child following an “improper[]” removal,333
and for determinations of Indian custodianship.334 Indian custodians, in
turn, can assert many of the same rights as parents under ICWA.
The incorporation of biology plus principles into state courts’
interpretations of “acknowledged or established” would align § #YX%(Y)
with the Supreme Court’s requirements for paternal rights to gain
constitutional sanction. This could assuage a Court uncomfortable with the
specter of a § #YX%(Y) unmoored from traditional modes of paternity
establishment. As such, ICWA’s definition of “parent” would be brought
into the fold of a broader subset of caselaw with which its parameters could
be defined.
Most importantly, a biology plus interpretation of § #YX%(Y) would ease
the interpretive tensions experienced by state courts struggling to grapple
with an ambiguous provision of a substantial federal law. The Court’s
reticence to get involved in resolving ICWA interpretive splits among state
courts has left the courts with little in the way of meaningful guidance by
which to resolve those splits. The biology plus case law could rectify that

328 Id. § #Y#W(a) (“In any involuntary proceeding . . . where the court knows or has reason
to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent . . . of the pending
proceedings and of their right of intervention.”).
329 Id. § #Y#W(b) (“In any case in which the court determines indigency, the parent . . . shall
have the right to court-appointed counsel in any removal, placement, or termination
proceeding.”).
330 Id. § #Y#%(a) (“Where any parent . . . consents to a foster care placement . . . such consent
shall not be valid unless executed in writing and recorded before a judge . . . and accompanied
by the presiding judge’s certificate that the terms and consequences of the consent were fully
explained in detail and were fully understood by the parent . . . .”).
331 Id. § #Y#%(c) (“In any voluntary proceeding for termination of parental rights to, or
adoptive placement of, an Indian child, the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for any
reason at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or adoption, as the case may
be, and the child shall be returned to the parent.”).
332 Id. § #Y#$(c) (“Where appropriate, the preferences of the Indian child or parent shall
be considered . . . .”).
333 Id. § #YWX (“Where any petitioner in an Indian child custody proceeding . . . has
improperly removed the child from custody of the parent . . . or has improperly retained custody
after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of custody, the court shall decline jurisdiction
over such petition and shall forthwith return the child to his parent . . . .”).
334 Id. § #YX%(O) (“‘Indian custodian’ means any Indian person who has legal custody of an
Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to whom temporary physical care,
custody, and control has been transferred by the parent of such child.”).
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by imbuing § #YX%(Y) with well-established principles created for the sole
purpose of determining the types of paternity issues implicated by the Act.
CONCLUSION
Family relations remain a vital part of the fabric of modern society.335
ICWA represents Congress’s contention that American Indian family
structures belong within that fabric as well. In many ways, the Supreme
Court’s biology plus jurisprudence reflects its fear of fatherhood as a
mercurial state, ebbing and flowing with the dilatory whims of biological
fathers inconsistently choosing to assert their paternal rights. That
jurisprudence began with a large grant of protection to fathers like Peter
Stanley, but was later winnowed to include almost exclusively fathers like
Peter Stanley. But in the course of that narrowing, the Court emphasized
principles of paternity which have reshaped family law and situated
fatherhood firmly within American jurisprudence. Extending that scope to
include ICWA has the benefit of clarifying an otherwise obscure provision
and reifying ICWA’s place within the tapestry of American family law.

335 See Moore v. E. Cleveland, ]%# U.S. ]Y], $X%-X] (#YPP) (“It is through the family that
we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”);
McCartney, supra note ]_, at $]O (“The family is the primary means by which a culture is
transmitted, and is the most important influence on the development of culture.”).

